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This thesis analyzes the effect of commissioning source on the retention and 
promotion outcomes of Naval officers to the O-4 promotion point.  In particular, this 
thesis analyzes differences in the joint probabilities of retention and promotion for 
officers from each commissioning program.  This study identifies improved measures of 
Navy officer performance and the relative cost-effectiveness of each commissioning 
program.   
A database of career milestones and productivity indicators for Navy officers 
from year groups 1983-1990 has been created from Navy Officer Data Card information 
and annual promotion board results through the career milestone point O-4.  Multivariate 
logit models of retention and promotion are specified to estimate the independent effect 
of accession source on URL and Restricted Line officer retention and promotion 
outcomes.  The logit models control for other determinants of retention and promotion 
such as undergraduate experience and capital investment.  Using an assumed steady-state 
flow of officers, differences in promotion and retention outcomes at various grades are 
used to estimate the number of accessions associated with producing a single O-4 from 
each commissioning program.  Total lifecycle costs required to retain and promote these 
officers to the O-4 point are calculated and used as the basis for the cost-effectiveness 
analysis.   
The cost-effectiveness outcomes depend on whether marginal or average costs are 
used.  However, the results suggest that for URL officers USNA is generally the most 
cost-effective commissioning program, but the ROTC-Contact program may be 
underutilized.  Additionally, the results do not support the belief that having a technical 
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The Navy spends millions of dollars to meet their annual requirement of newly 
commissioned officers.  However, to date, very few comprehensive analyses of these 
programs have been undertaken.  In absence of such analyses, Department of Defense 
(OSD) decision makers lack a theoretical or empirical framework for evaluating these 
programs, and for making tradeoff decisions among alternate commissioning programs.  
Currently, the demand for experienced and more senior Unrestricted Line (URL) officers 
is expected to grow.  In order to make trade-off decisions and incremental increases in 
accessions in response to this demand, the Navy’s leadership needs to know if one 
accession source is producing a specific community of officers at a rate less costly than 
another accession source.  The United States Naval Academy (USNA) is believed to be 
the premier commissioning program for increased future accessions (Parcell, 2001).  The 
results in this thesis may signal a need to access more of these officers to fill personnel 
shortages that cannot be met by the ROTC program, and would otherwise require 
additional OCS accessions.  This research will provide OSD with reliable, scientifically 
verifiable, measures of the costs and benefits of the Navy’s officer commissioning 
programs. 
Historically, the U.S. Naval Academy has been the premier source of regular 
commissioned officers.  Since World War II, a secondary source of regular 
commissioned officers became institutionalized through the Navy Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (NROTC) program (Bowman, 1995).  The combination of USNA and 
NROTC’s competitive scholarship program have been the foundation of the Navy’s 
highly trained, technically proficient corps of career officers.  A third commissioning 
program, Officer Candidate School (OCS), was institutionalized nearly 30 years ago to 
meet accessions shortages not met by the Naval Academy and NROTC programs.  The 
OCS program currently provides a substantial number of accessions in both URL and 
Restricted Line officer communities by direct appointment of carefully screened college 
graduates.   
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In the early 1990’s, there was significant congressional debate concerning the 
Navy’s officer accession programs.  In particular, proposals were made to close the Naval 
Academy due to the high education and training costs associated with each USNA 
graduate, relative to substantially lower pre-commissioning costs for NROTC and OCS 
accessions.  Since this time, various studies have sought to analyze the Navy’s officer 
commissioning programs to determine the economic benefits and cost-effectiveness of 
each program. 
This thesis will use the economic theory of human capital investment in order to 
provide the framework for evaluating these commissioning programs.  The human capital 
model treats education and training programs as strategic investments that yield a stream 
of future returns.  The application of this theory will be consistent with previous studies 
that empirically have examined the relationship between military officer on-the-job 
productivity and commissioning source and various educational programs.  By analyzing 
lifecycle productivity profiles of a sample of Navy officers, the economic benefits of 
officer commissioning programs and the associated economic costs of these programs 
can be assessed.  Economic benefits will be measured in terms of increases in 
productivity, while economic costs will be measured as opportunity costs of foregone 
productivity. 
The human capital model will further assist in answering the primary and 
secondary research issues of this thesis. The primary research issue is simply to identify 
measures of program impact to evaluate the effectiveness of each commissioning 
program.  The secondary research issue is to assess the cost and value of these programs 
to the Navy.  Again, answers to these issues will be useful to Navy decision makers who 
face the challenge of meeting future demand for an increased number of more senior 
officers.  The methodology developed in this thesis uses logit retention and promotion 
models and steady state cost analysis as the foundation for evaluating each alternate 
commissioning program.  To this end, officer retention and promotion to the O-4 career 
point have been chosen as the two primary measures of program impact.   
A database of the career milestones and productivity indicators for Navy officers 
has been created for use in this study.  The database consists of Navy Officer Data Card 
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information and annual promotion board results through the career milestone point O-4, 
in order to analyze the difference in the joint probabilities of retention and promotion for 
officers from each commissioning source.  The analysis will track officer retention and 
promotion for each officer from pay grade O-1 to O-4.  Using an assumed steady-state 
flow of officers, the differences in the promotion and retention outcomes at various 
grades will be used to estimate the number of accessions associated with producing a 
single O-4 from each alternate accession source.  Total lifecycle costs required to retain 
and promote these officers to the O-4 point will be calculated and used as the basis for 
the cost-effectiveness analysis. 
Both the cost and performance measures typically used in prior studies cited are 
reviewed first in this thesis.  This review is followed by a description of the data and 
methodology used in this thesis to analyze performance differences.  Preliminary analysis 
of retention and promotion rate differentials of officers from different commissioning 
programs and communities is discussed in Chapter IV.  Regression models of officer 
retention and promotion outcomes are developed in Chapter V.  These models estimate 
the effect of accession source, undergraduate experience, and human capital investment 
on officer retention and promotion outcomes.  Given the retention and promotion rate 
differentials discussed in Chapter IV, and the multivariate regression results in Chapter 
IV, the number of accessions required to maintain a given steady state endstrength and 
force structure will be calculated.  The steady state number of accessions provide the 
basis for the cost-effectiveness analysis of commissioning sources presented in Chapter 
VI.  This thesis hopes to identify improved measures of Navy officer performance and 
identify any potential cost savings that may be generated by making changes in policies 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The review of relevant literature of prior analyses of officer accession sources 
should begin with discussion of salient effectiveness measures that have been based to 
describe the retention and promotion of Naval officers.  Prior studies have used pre-
commissioning costs and career survival rates as the basis for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of alternate commissioning programs.  Such analyses do not account for the 
Navy’s investment in its officers as assets that generate a flow of future returns.  The 
economic theory of human capital is a fundamental concept underlying the evaluation of 
cost-effectiveness models of officer accessions.  This chapter of the study identifies prior 
analyses that use pre-commissioning cost, mean length of service, and survival rates as 
measures of officer performance, while providing examples of current studies that have 
used human capital investment theory. 
A. WEAKNESSES IN PRIOR COST ANALYSES OF COMMISSIONING 
SOURCE 
Pre-commissioning costs for each commissioning source must be interpreted 
carefully.  The underlying criticism of prior cost studies is that pre-commissioning costs 
can be calculated either on the basis of average costs or marginal costs.  Knowing the 
average cost of commissioning an officer is useful in examining a commissioning 
program that operates at full capacity with specified overhead costs, normally treated as 
efficiency training costs.  Historically, the United States Naval Academy (USNA) and the 
Officer Candidate School program (OCS) have operated at full capacity.  Average pre-
commissioning training costs associated with these programs have been based on the full 
cost of administering the program, regardless of incremental changes in the USNA 
midshipman brigade or OCS class size.  In the case of the Reserve Officer Training Corps 
ROTC, average pre-commissioning costs account for both the cost of administering the 
program at each public or private college and university, as well as the cost of tuition per 
person.  However, average cost would not be indicative of the incremental costs 
associated with increasing or decreasing officer accessions by some specified amount 
from a given commissioning program in order to meet expected personnel or readiness 
shortages and surpluses.  For the latter purpose, marginal costs would have to be 
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calculated.  That is, the change in marginal costs must be used, for example, if one is 
examining expanding or contracting the Brigade of Midshipman at USNA by 1000 
students. 
Various studies have attempted to compare officer commissioning programs by 
using either average or marginal cost, yet it is important to note there are substantial 
differences between these two cost concepts.  Average costs account for what the Navy 
has actually spent on each graduate from each program, while marginal costs can be seen 
as the cost associated with making incremental changes to the size of each accession 
program.  In a recent 2001 study, the Center for Naval Analyses computed the marginal 
cost of producing an accession from three different commissioning programs. These 
marginal costs were computed to be: USNA = $121,000; ROTC = $132,000; and OCS = 
$58,000 (Parcell, 2001).  However, in a different study, average costs for these same 
three programs in 1990 were reported to the Congressional Budget Office as follows: 
USNA = $153,000; ROTC = 53,000, and OCS = $20,000 (Bowman 1995).  Despite not 
inflating the 1990 CBO cost estimates to 2001 dollars, there are noticeable differences 
between relative average and marginal costs, not only between 1990 and 2001, but also 
between commissioning programs.  Looking at the marginal costs would lead a policy 
maker to believe an ROTC accession would cost relatively more than a USNA accession 
and more than twice that of an OCS accession.  The average cost data, on the other hand, 
suggests that the cost of a USNA graduate is three times that of an ROTC graduate, and 
seven times that of an OCS graduate.  This thesis will discuss both average and marginal 
costs later in the steady state cost chapter. 
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One criticism of prior studies is that most cost analyses only account for pre-
commissioning costs.  By not accounting for differences in post-commissioning training 
costs, these studies do not provide enough information to the accessions decision maker 
to accurately judge cost-effectiveness.  Additionally, the study must distinguish between 
historical average costs and the current marginal costs associated with incremental 
accession changes.  Differences in pre-commissioning costs impact cost-effectiveness 
decisions more in communities where post-commissioning education and training costs 
are low (eg., SWO, SUB) relative to communities where education and training costs are 
high (eg., Pilot, NFO) (Bowman, 1995). 
Another criticism of prior analyses is the potential aggregation bias that may exist 
when commissioning sources are evaluated as a whole and not by warfare or restricted 
line community.  Some studies have committed aggregation bias in statistics based on the 
mean length of service of officers from different accession sources (Mackin and Darling, 
1996).  These studies have generally found that measures of officer job tenure do not vary 
by commissioning source, yet these measures are aggregated for entire commissioning 
programs and do not account for differences related to the type of community (Bowman, 
1995).  If there are differences in either mean length of service, retention rates, or even 
promotion rates between both restricted and unrestricted line communities, for example, 
it does not seem reasonable to evaluate the Navy’s officer commissioning programs with 
this method.  Similarly, using a mean value as a statistic for gauging length of service is 
not useful in making career milestone comparisons of officers from different accessions 
sources.  Comparisons of mean length of service are not as valuable as knowing 
percentages of accessions that stay to the O-3 (LT), O-4 (LCDR), or O-5 (CDR) and 
beyond point. 
Many officer cost studies rely on survival rates as a measure of officer 
performance (Parcell, 2001).  These survival rates reflect the percentage of officers that 
remain on active duty from one year to next.  However, they do not account for 
promotion differences between communities of officers, nor do they account for true 
voluntary decisions to remain on active service, when officers are not under obligation.  
As there are substantial differences between the length of obligated service for 
unrestricted line officers (pilots, naval flight officers, submarine officers and surface 
warfare officers) it is not reasonable to compare survival rates of communities, just as it 
is not reasonable to compare survival rates of accession sources by the same method.   
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Perhaps the most important problem with the use of survival rates as a measure of 
officer performance is that decision makers are unable to determine why an officer 
chooses to leave the Navy and what factors influence the stay or leave decision.  
Additionally, it is important to note that as the Navy’s current officer corps has 
experienced the effects of a military draw-down in the early 1990’s, survival rates of 
these officers would not distinguish between officers that chose to leave and those 
officers that were forced out due to decreased promotion or command opportunities.  
In summary, prior analyses of the cost-effectiveness of commissioning programs 
have failed to develop accurate measures of the costs of producing an officer at a 
designated career milestone.  Neither average or marginal pre-commissioning costs alone, 
nor statistics for mean length of service, nor survival rates, are capable of predicting true 
measures of program impact: retention and promotion probabilities for an individual 
officer.  Since the measures developed in prior studies do not account for retention and 
promotion differences, there is no way to apply a cost analysis that provides an 
accessions planner with a framework for evaluating different commissioning programs.  
The next section of this thesis will identify recent studies that have used the human 
capital model as it relates to organizational investment decisions and econometric 
techniques for evaluating officer retention and promotion. 
B. PRIOR STUDIES OF OFFICER RETENTION AND PROMOTION  
1. Study by Cymrot on Graduate Education 
In his 1986 study, “Graduate Education and the Promotion of Officers,” Donald J. 
Cymrot (Cymrot, 1996) states that an individual officer’s productivity can be measured 
by indicators such as performance evaluations, retention, and promotion.  In his study, he 
uses a binary logit model to estimate and evaluate the effects of fully-funded graduate 
education on Navy officer promotions.  In his models, he uses officer promotion as the 
dependant variable, since he argues that promotion to the ranks of O-4 through O-7 is a 
valuable measure of an officer’s productivity throughout their career.  
Cymrot’s study can be questioned for a lack of true cohort data; rather, he used 
cross-sectional data from the 1985 Officer Master File.  Also, sample selection bias may 
be present in the study because he failed to account for retention differences between the 
officers in the data sample who have stayed in the Navy to various career points.  Despite 
these shortcomings, he did construct a valuable framework for evaluating promotion 
probabilities of Navy officers.  In addition to including explanatory variables for graduate 
education, he included demographic variables to account for differences in race, gender, 
and age in his model.  He also included variables for service designator in his logit 
models.  
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Cymrot’s study indicates that graduate education did in fact increase the 
probability of promotion to the next higher rank.  The computed effect of graduate 
education was both statistically significant and positive for the ranks O-4 through O-6.  
Cymrot also found that older officers were more likely to promote than younger officers 
in the data set.  
Although Cymrot’s study did not provide the cost-analysis framework that will be 
required and developed in this study, it did identify measures of program impact (officer 
promotion) that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of different commissioning 
programs.  Cymrot’s study also provides valuable insight into computing the partial 
effect of each explanatory variable on the binomial dependent variable in a logit model. 
One calculation involves comparing an individual with a set of selected characteristics to 
individuals with the same base case characteristics. A key difference between the type of 
logit model used in this thesis and Cymrot’s logit model is the inclusion of both 
demographic and human capital explanatory variables.  This allows for promotion 
comparisons between individuals in the same community, but who were accessed under 
different commissioning programs. 
2. Study by Mehay on the Impact of Race/Ethnicity on Junior Officer 
Performance 
In his 1995 equal opportunity study for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), “Analysis of Performance Data for Junior Navy and Marine Corps Officers,” 
Stephen L. Mehay (Mehay, 1995) analyzes the career paths of junior USN and USMC 
officers in order to identify differences in both career progress and measured performance 
between minority and non-minority officers.  He uses data from of an updated version of 
the Navy Officer Promotion History Data File merged with data from separate files 
containing background characteristics, work experience, and other factors for O-3 
promotion boards between fiscal years 1981 through 1985, and O-4 promotion boards 
between fiscal years 1985 through 1990.  By merging these data files, he was able to 
accurately identify officers who voluntary separated from the Navy or Marine Corps.  
Unlike Cymrot, Mehay used the econometric technique of bivariate probit 
analysis to estimate the maximum likelihoods for the binary dependent variables, 
retention and promotion.  His empirical analysis specified and estimated probit models of 
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on-the-job-performance, where job performance was a function of cognitive skills, 
affective non-academic skills, and other demographic characteristics.  The study 
attempted to determine what portion of observed performance differences were directly 
related to race and which observed performance difference were the result of other 
characteristics.  Mehay’s explanatory variables were associated with four distinct 
groupings: 1) college background; 2) personal demographics; 3) fitness report 
performance; and 4) Navy experience.  
Mehay found that the effects of race/ethnicity were masked by the effects of other 
variables in the model and that the direct effect of minority status is reduced when other 
variables that are correlated with race/ethnicity (and an interaction variable for school 
selectivity) are included in the set of explanatory variables.  Mehay also found that the 
effect of minority status on promotion was negative due in part to a negative effect of 
minority status on fitness report ratings.  He concluded that it was extremely difficult to 
model the relationship between race/ethnic background and career success because 
causality could not be inferred between race and performance based solely on the results 
of the probit models. 
Instead, Mehay proposed that pre-commissioning intervention and accession 
policies were probably the best way to address observed race or ethnicity performance 
differences.  In his discussion of the Surface Warfare community, he presented the 
argument that lower minority performance evaluations were based on lower warfare 
qualification rates, and that lower qualifications rates could be traced all the way back to 
class rankings in college and resultant initial ship assignments.  In the case of junior 
Marie Corps officers, he concluded that lower promotion outcomes for minorities 
resulted from background characteristics, such as GCT scores and previous performance, 
vice a direct effect associated with race or ethnicity. 
3. Study by North and Smith on Impact of Race/Ethnicity on Marine 
Corps Officer Promotion 
In a 1993 CNA study, “Officer Accession Characteristics and Promotions to 
Captain and Major,” North and Smith (North and Smith, 1993) used a different approach 
than Cymrot in trying to estimate the effect of race and ethnicity on the promotion rates 
of Marines to the ranks of O-3 and O-4.  Unlike Cymrot, who only looked at graduate 
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education and promotion in a binomial logit model, North and Smith used a series of 
bivariate probit models to evaluate the joint probability that a Marine officer would both 
stay on active service until a given promotion board and would be promoted at the board. 
In order to evaluate both retention and promotion, North and Smith created a data 
file who include longitudinal The Basic School (TBS) Files for all Marine officers that 
attended post-commissioning training in Quantico, Virginia between 1980 and 1991, and 
then merged those files with O-3 and O-4 promotion board results for those same cohorts. 
This allowed the authors to evaluate retention in a bivariate probit model for all officers 
who were accessed.  A probit promotion model was then used to evaluate the sample of 
officers that remained on active duty at the time of the O-3 and O-4 promotion boards.  
The bivariate probit estimation technique accounts for selection in the promotion 
outcome that is associated with the retention decision.  That is, the characteristic of 
stayers may be systematically different from leavers and thus may bias estimated 
coefficients. 
North and Smith included demographic explanatory variables (age, race, marital 
status, and prior enlisted service) in their probit models as well as explanatory variables 
to account for an individual’s military occupational specialty (MOS).  North and Smith 
also created variables for accession source, as well as control variables for promotion 
board year, to account for varying cohort size and promotion opportunities among 12 
different year groups. Important to note in these promotion results, however, is that 
although 12 year groups were contained in the data set, only 4 year groups (1980-1983) 
could be evaluated for O-4 promotion (9.5 year point) at the time of the study. 
In terms of promotion results by accession source, North and Smith found that 
USNA and ROTC graduates had higher probabilities of promotion and were more likely 
to promote to O-3 and O-4 than officers from other accession sources.  Additionally, 
North and Smith concluded that while Black and other minority Marine officers were less 
likely to be promoted to O-3, none of the race variables were statistically significant in 
the O-4 promotion models. Interestingly, they found that although promotion rates appear 
lower for black officers, controlling for background characteristics reduces the difference 
in promotion probability by more than half at the O-3 board, and completely eliminates 
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the difference in promotion probability at the O-4 board.  This result was similar to that 
of Mehay for Navy officers. 
Coincidentally, as is the case with many retention and promotion studies, North 
and Smith found that marital status and MOS impact both the decision to stay on active 
duty and the probability of promotion.  Both explanatory variables were statistically 
significant and the results concluded that married officers were more likely to promote to 
both O-3 and O-4, and Marine aviators were more likely to promote to O-3 and O-4 than 
officers with other occupational specialties in the data set.      
4. Study by Bowman on Cost-Effectiveness of Service Academies 
William R. Bowman’s 1995, “Cost-Effectiveness of Service Academies: New 
Evidence from Navy Warfare Communities,”(Bowman, 1995) is the only prior study of 
alternate accession sources that applies a cost analysis to the different commissioning 
programs in a steady state environment.  This study provides the methodology that is 
applied in this thesis.  Bowman’s study analyzes both retention and promotion probability 
differences between warfare and restricted line communities with the use of econometric 
probit models.  He analyzes the effect of both demographic and human capital variables 
on the retention and promotion of URL and restricted line officers in year groups 1976 
through 1981.  Similar to the studies of Mehay and North and Smith, he merges actual 
cohort Officer Data Card information with promotion and selection board results.   
Bowman develops a fundamentally different measure of effectiveness from other 
studies. This measure is the number of newly commissioned officers required to replace 
those officers who leave active duty, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in a steady state 
environment at given career points.  He computes the steady state accessions necessary to 
replace a group or community of officers from a single accession source based on the 
retention and promotion rates for the group.  A simple example of this methodology is as 
follows: If 1000 pilots were accessed in a single year group from commissioning source 
A, and 200 of those pilots promote to O-4 (at 10 years of service) at first look (in-zone or 
below-zone), then the steady state number of pilot accessions for source A = 1/.20 = 5.0.  
That is, to maintain a flow of officers that ensures there will be 1,000 pilots available at 
year 10, the Navy must access 5,000 new pilots at entry. 
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Bowman uses the computed steady state number of accessions to evaluate three 
different commissioning programs (USNA, ROTC, and OCS) in four URL communities 
(Surface, Submarine, Pilot, and NFO.)  He further computes total discounted lifecycle 
costs per officer as the product of total discounted training costs (pre-and post 
commissioning) and steady state accession requirements.  The justification for this type 
of cost analysis is based on the Navy’s front-loading of human capital investments early 
in an officer’s career with the expectation that the Navy will realize economic returns on 
their investment in the form of longer job tenure and higher levels of productivity. 
Bowman further states that since one cannot monetize the value of the productivity of 
officers over their careers, he replaces cost-benefit analyses with a cost-effectiveness 
analysis. 
Table 23 (p. 94) of his study has been reproduced in Table 1 to demonstrate how 
discounted lifecycle costs are calculated.  The required number of accessions are shown 
in column 4 and life cycle costs are displayed in column 5.  This methodology will be the 
basis for all cost analyses developed in this thesis. 
Bowman’s results show that USNA graduates have a higher propensity to remain 
on active duty and to promote in-zone in two of the four URL communities (Submarine 
and Pilot).  The turnover rates of USNA accessions require less up-front human capital 
investments to be made by the Navy.  These figures also support the belief that the Navy 
is making a cost-effective investment decision in spending an average of nearly $200,000 
on the undergraduate costs of USNA graduates.  Conversely, the Navy does not get the 
same return on its investment in OCS accessions, despite spending only $28,523 in pre-
commissioning training costs, due to significantly higher turnover rates of OCS graduates 
compared to USNA and ROTC graduates.  Also important to note in these results is that 
Bowman found OCS graduates to be the most cost-effective source for the Surface 







Table 1.   Calculations of Discounted Lifecycle Costs. 
DISCOUNTED LIFECYCLE COSTS OF PRE-AND POST-COMMISSIONING HUMAN CAPITAL 













SUBMARINE:      
USNA 187,808 130,519 318,327 5.42 1,725,332 
ROTC 76,731 120,757 197,488 9.58 1,891,935 
OCS 35,951 110,761 146,712 21.45 3,146,972 
SURFACE:      
USNA 187,808 94,708 282,516 6.91 1,952,186 
ROTC 76,731 84,578 161,309 11.82 1,906,672 
OCS 35,951 79,251 115,202 14.76 1,700,382 
PILOT:      
USNA 187,808 1,124,102 1,311,910 7.40 9,708,134 
ROTC 76,731 1,102,705 1,179,436 9.96 11,747,183 
OCS 28,523 1,075,021 1,103,544 14.12 15,582,041 
NFO:      
USNA 187,808 1,270,529 1,458,337 8.97 13,081,283 
ROTC 76,731 1,262,641 1,339,372 8.65 11,585,568 
OCS 28,523 1,260,213 1,288,736 13.73 17,694,345 
NOTES:      
1.      Pre-commissioning costs taken from Table 17, post-commissioning costs from Table 22. 
2.      Number of accessions required to maintain steady state (column 5) taken from Figures X-XIII. 
3.    Discounted lifecycle costs (column 6) derived as the product of total discounted costs (column 4) and the 
number of accessions (column 5). 
 
From: [Bowman, 1995. “Cost-Effectiveness of Service Academies: New Evidence from 
Navy Warfare Communities”, Table 23, p. 94] 
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Finally, in answering the question whether service academies are worth the price, 
Bowman found that, in general, maintaining ROTC units and the Naval Academy reduces 
both turnover costs related to voluntary quits, and involuntary separations required to 
maintain endstrength and force structure numbers.  ROTC and USNA commissioning 
programs develop more firm-specific human capital during the pre-commissioning 
training period, therefore reducing voluntary separations and making officers from those 
programs more productive in the fleet compared to officers accessed through OCS.  
Bowman also acknowledges the finding that the voluntary stay or leave decision prior to 
the O-4 promotion board was largely unrelated to commissioning source or pre-
commissioning training for USNA graduates and more likely to be related to an 
individual’s marital status and initial experience in the fleet while serving in their initial 
obligated service.  This finding is similar to that of North and Smith, as the effects of 
marital status and fleet experience seem to dominate and even reduce the pre-
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Data for this thesis were collected from several different sources by William R. 
Bowman, Economics Department, U.S. Naval Academy.  The data consists of Navy 
Officer Data Card Information for both Unrestricted and Restricted Line Officers in year 
groups 1983 through 1990.  These files were identified by social security number and 
merged with current O-3 (LT) and O-4 (LCDR) selection and promotion board results 
from fiscal years 1986 through 2001.   
The data file consisted of 295 personal characteristics for each officer accessed 
under five different commissioning programs.  The initial data file contained records on 
25,212 officers.  Observations with missing critical data were removed from the sample; 
2,934 observations were deleted from the file due to missing academic proficiency codes 
(APC) relating to undergraduate grade point average.  Additionally, a commissioning age 
criterion was established, so that only officers between 20 and 30 years of age at 
commission were retained.  The data file included a very small number of officers that 
fell below 20 years of age, and older than 35 years of age at commissioning; 15 
observations were deleted from the file due to these criteria.  After these deletions, 
17,134 URL observations and 5,129 Restricted Line observations remained in the data 
file for analysis. 
As specified in Bowman (1995), exclusion of cases that have no observed value 
for important explanatory factors introduces potential bias into a study. In this thesis, 
2,934 observations (15% of total sample) were deleted due to missing academic 
proficiency codes.  These numerical codes are assigned by the Naval Postgraduate School 
to identify undergraduate academic proficiency in three areas: the grade point average of 
all undergraduate courses taken for credit, grades obtained in mathematics (calculus-
based) courses, and grades obtained in physics based science and engineering courses. 
These three proficiency codes are used for selection and screening purposes of fully 
funded graduate education at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and 
several civilian universities.  As academic and educational achievement are signs of 
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increased knowledge and skill, these academic proficiency codes also serve as a signal of 
superior ability and performance (Woodhall, 1987), which are likely to influence the 
retention and promotion outcomes of officers.  APC1 as a measure of grade point average 
is an important explanatory variable in the logit retention and promotion models 
developed in this thesis.  Bias arises if the officers with missing APC codes are 
systematically different from those with APC codes. 
Sample selection bias may affect parameter estimates in multivariate models due 
to retention decisions made by officers.  Retention to the O-4 board in this thesis is 
defined as the voluntary decision to stay or leave active duty service to the 10-year point.  
Minimum service requirements (MSR) for year groups 1983 through 1990 ranges from 
four years to seven years.  Thus, most of the officers in the data file used here were free 
to make a voluntary stay-leave decision.  The only exception would be pilots and Naval 
Flight Officers (NFO’s).  In this data, pilots and NFO’s experienced varied obligated 
service, from six to seven years beginning after their warfare “winged” qualification date. 
Consequently, a substantial portion of these officers were still serving their MSR at the 
time they appeared at the O-4 promotion board.  Additionally, MSRs for both pilots and 
NFOs were dependent on type of aircraft selected while in the secondary phase of the 
aviation training program.  Statistics for years of commissioned service at completion of 
MSR were not available for analysis for any observations in the data file.  Therefore, an 
unidentified percentage of aviators may not have made a true voluntary stay/leave 
decision prior to the O-4 board. 
In an attempt to control for aggregation bias, the retention and promotion models 
are estimated separately for URL and Restricted Line (RL) officers.  Within the URL 
community, separate promotion models were estimated for three individual URL 
communities (Surface, Submarine, and Aviation) and one RL group. The hypothesis 
behind this sorting is that different communities experience different retention and 
promotion behavior and different factors affect both the retention and the promotion of 
these groups of officers.  This hypothesis is based on the results of Bowman (1995).  The 
next section of this thesis will discuss model specification and dependent and 
independent variables used in the logit models. 
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B. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Model specification is based on Bowman (1995), Mehay (1995), and Bowman 
and Mehay (2002).  Non-linear logit models of retention and promotion are specified to 
estimate the individual (partial) effect of accession sources separate from demographic, 
pre-commissioning, and post-commissioning characteristics.  The logit models allow 
analysis of the change in the dependent variable (retention or promotion to O-4) with 
respect to a change in a specific explanatory variable, (ceteris paribus) holding the effect 
of all other explanatory variables in the model constant.  The hypothesis about the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variables is believed to 
be non-linear, therefore a logit model is used for analysis of retention and promotion 
probabilities.  Interpretation of all logit model results will be discussed in Chapters IV 
and V of this thesis.  
C. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Variables are grouped into the following categories: Outcomes, Demographics, 
Human Capital, College Selectivity, Community Designators, and Control Variables.  
Table 2 lists each variable from the Accession Cohort Samples (URL and Restricted 
Line) and its description. The variable description corresponds to how each dependant 
and explanatory variable was coded.  
1. Outcomes 
The two outcomes analyzed in this thesis are STAY04BD and HPROM04. 
STAY04BD is the dependent variable that captures whether or not an officer stayed on 
active service to the O-4 promotion board; STAY04BD = 1 if the officer stayed, and 
STAY04BD =0 if the officer either voluntarily or involuntarily left the Navy prior to 
appearing before the O-4 promotion board (at 9.5 years of commissioned service on 
average).  The HPROM04 variable distinguishes whether or not the officer promoted to 
O-4 at first look if they remained on active service.  Promotion at first look is defined in 
this thesis as those officers that promote “in-zone” or “below-zone.”  HPROM04 =1 for 
those officers that promoted at first look; HPROM04 =0 for officers that either failed to 
promote to O-4 or promoted “above-zone”. 
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Table 2.   Variable Name and Description, Grouped by Category. 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Outcomes   
STAY04BD = 1 IF SURVIVED TO O-4 BOARD; = 0 OTHERWISE 
HPROM04 = 1 IF PROMOTED TO O-4 AT FIRST LOOK; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Demographics   
AGE_COMM  AGE AT COMMISSIONING (IN YEARS) 
WHITE = 1 IF RACE IS WHITE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
BLACK = 1 IF RACE IS BLACK; = 0 OTHERWISE 
OTHER = 1 IF RACE IS NOT WHITE OR BLACK; = 0 OTHERWISE 
FEMALE = 1 IF GENDER IS FEMALE; = 0 IF MALE 
SNC = 1 IF SINGLE WITH NO CHILDREN; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SWC = 1 IF SINGLE WITH CHILDREN; = 0 OTHERWISE 
MNC = 1 IF MARRIED WITH NO CHILDREN; = 0 OTHERWISE 
MWC = 1 IF MARRIED WITH CHILDREN; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Human Capital   
SOMEPRIOR = 1 IF 1 TO 4 YRS ACTIVE ENLISTED TIME; = 0 OTHERWISE 
TECHMAJ = 1 IF UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR IS TECHNICAL; = 0 OTHERWISE 
USNA = 1 IF ACCESSION SOURCE IS USNA; = 0 OTHERWISE 
ROTCS = 1 IF ACCESSION SOURCE IS ROTC SCHOLARSHIP; = 0 OTHERWISE 
ROTCC = 1 IF ACCESSION SOURCE IS ROTC CONTRACT; = 0 OTHERWISE 
OCS = 1 IF ACCESSION SOURCE IS OCS; = 0 OTHERWISE 
ECP = 1 IF ACCESSED UNDER ECP WITH ROTC SCHOLARSHIP; = 0 OTHERWISE 
NAPC1 ORDINAL (0-5). ACADEMIC PROFILE CODE (UNDERGRADUATE GPA) 
NAPC2 ORDINAL (0-6). ACADEMIC PROFILE CODE (CALCULUS EXPERIENCE) 
NAPC3 ORDINAL (0-6). ACADEMIC PROFILE CODE (ENG/PHYSICS EXPERIENCE) 
College Selectivity   
TOPCOLL = 1 IF COLLEGE ATTENDED IS HIGHLY SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
MIDCOLL = 1 IF COLLEGE ATTENDED IS SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
LOCOLL = 1 IF COLLEGE ATTENDED IS NOT SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
Community Designators  
SWO = 1 IF SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SUB = 1 IF SUBMARINE OFFICER; = 0 OTHERWISE 
AIR = 1 IF PILOT OR NFO; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SPECWO = 1 IF SPEC WARFARE OR SPEC OPS OFFICER; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SUPPLY = 1 IF SUPPLY CORPS OFFICER; = 0 OTHERWISE 
FLTSUPP = 1 IF FLEET SUPPORT OFFICER; = 0 OTHERWISE 
RLSO = 1 IF RESTRICTED LINE, NOT SUPPLY OR FLT SUPPORT; = 0 OTHERWISE
Control Variables  
YRG83 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1983; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG84 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1984; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG85 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1985; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG86 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1986; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG87 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1987; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG88 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1988; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG89 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1989; = 0 OTHERWISE 
YRG90 = 1 IF ACCESSED IN YEAR GROUP 1990; = 0 OTHERWISE 
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2. Demographics  
Each study reviewed above in Chapter II used a combination of demographic 
variables to explain variation in either retention or promotion rates.  The sociological 
norms of the Navy, as well as structural differences in professional opportunities, 
(particularly promotion and retention), within military organizations all impact the 
behavior of individuals of different age, gender, race, and family status. (Branigan, 2001) 
AGE_COMM is a continuous variable that reflects an officer’s age at the time of 
commission.  Officers who are older at the time of commission are sometimes considered 
more mature than younger officers, and may be more productive in their initial tours of 
service. Higher age at commission may also reflect prior enlisted service.  Increased 
productivity would indicate higher levels of professional success and expertise than less 
productive officers, and therefore may not only promote at higher rates than younger 
officers, but may experience higher retention rates due to increased military satisfaction 
during those initial tours. 
The variables WHITE, BLACK and OTHER are all binary variables that reflect 
an officer’s race or ethnicity.  The variable OTHER indicates any race listed in the 
individual’s Officer Data Card information other than white or black.  North and Smith 
(1993), Mehay (1995), and Bowman (1995) all found that minority status impacts 
retention behavior, as well as promotion to either O-3 or O-4. 
The variable FEMALE is a binary variable that reflects an officer’s gender. 
FEMALE =1 indicates the officer is female, while FEMALE = 0 indicates the officer is 
male. This explanatory variable is another reason that supports separating URLs from 
Restricted Line Officers in the LOGIT analysis.  Although females make up less than 5% 
of the total sample of URLs, they represent 32% of Restricted Line officers.  
SNC, SWC, MNC, and MWC are all binary variables that reflect an officer’s 
combined marital and dependent status.  SNC corresponds to single officers with no 
children, while SWC reflects single officers with children.  MNC reflects married officers 
that have no children, and MWC reflects married officers that have at least one child. 
North and Smith (1993), and Bowman and Mehay (1999) found that married officers 
were more likely to promote to O-4 in the Navy and Marine Corps than officers who 
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were single. North and Smith (1993) also concluded that married officers were more 
likely to stay to the O-4 selection board than single officers. 
3. Human Capital Indicators 
Variables were constructed to group officers into one of five different accession 
source categories.  This thesis creates commissioning source variables to distinguish 
between USNA, ROTC Scholarship, ROTC Contract, OCS, and ECP accessions.  This is 
a different specification than Bowman (1995), Bowman and Mehay (2002), and Parcell 
(2001), who use USNA, ROTC and OCS as the three accessions categories in their 
studies, and find that USNA graduates are more likely to promote and remain on active 
service beyond O-4 than officers from ROTC and OCS.  Data was available to 
distinguish ROTC contract and ECP officers from the entire sub-sample of officers who 
attended ROTC training.  ECP officers in this case had served at least one tour of active 
enlisted service and participated in ROTC training.  Using five categories of accession 
source instead of three also made it possible to identify retention and promotion 
differences among three different groups of officers that would have otherwise been 
grouped into a single ROTC category, even though the cost of each of these programs 
differs considerably. 
TECHMAJ and the three NAPC variables reflect an officer’s undergraduate 
academic experience.  Bowman and Mehay (2002) found that officers with undergraduate 
degrees in engineering, mathematics, science, and business were more likely to promote 
to O-4 than those with humanities degrees.  For the purpose of this thesis, technical 
majors were considered to be officers with degrees in engineering, mathematics, and 
science.  Economics, business, political science and all other humanities majors were 
considered non-technical.  As the URL communities are considered technically 
demanding duty, it is believed that having a technical degree increases an officer’s 
performance and promotion opportunity.  However, Bowman (1990) and Bowman and 
Mehay (2002) found little support for the hypothesis that a technical degree is necessary 
for success in the Navy, despite URL communities emphasizing the policy of requiring 
officers with technical degrees.  
22 
The three APC variables are believed to have similar effects on retention and 
promotion. APC scores of 0 and 1 correspond to higher academic achievement, thus 
greater pre-commissioning performance and ability.  NAPC1 as a measure of GPA may 
also have a signaling effect to senior raters as post-commissioning ability.  It is important 
to note that the NAPC1 scale is reversed: values of 0 correspond to higher GPA’s, while 
an NAPC1 score of 5 indicates a low undergraduate GPA.         
SOMEPRIOR is another binary variable that reflects whether or not an officer 
completed any active enlisted service prior to being commissioned.  Since retention and 
promotion in this thesis will be evaluated only to the O-4 promotion board, two different 
hypotheses exist about the relationship between prior enlisted service and retention.  
Officers with prior service may be less likely to stay to the O-4 promotion board if they 
have served 20 years of combined service and are eligible for retirement before reaching 
the O-4 board career point.  Conversely, officers with prior service have more experience 
in the fleet and may be more productive and better assimilated into the Navy’s 
organizational culture. Wielsma (1996) found that prior enlisted officers were more likely 
to remain on active service until the O-4 board, but less likely to promote to O-4.  I 
expect that officers with prior enlisted service will be more likely to retain and promote 
to O-4 than officers with no prior service.   
4. College Selectivity 
Bowman and Mehay (2002) found that Navy officers who graduated from top 
rated private schools receive better performance ratings during the early career period and 
are more likely to promote at the up-or-out point (historically the O-4 board).  The three 
variables constructed for college selectivity (TOPCOLL, MIDCOLL, LOCOLL) reflect 
the selectivity of an officer’s undergraduate college, as ranked by Barron’s publication, 
“Profiles of American Colleges.”  Barons ranked these colleges on a scale of 1 to 6, with 
a ranking of 1 corresponding to “most selective” and a ranking of 6 corresponding to 
“least selective.”  The variable TOPCOLL consisted of observations with a Barron’s 
score of 1 or 2.  The variable MIDCOLL consisted of observations with a Barron’s score 
of 3 or 4.  Observations with Barron’s scores of 5 or 6 were identified as LOCOLL.  
These college selectivity variables were not included in the set of explanatory variables 
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for the retention and promotion models; however, the variable TOPCOLL was used to 
construct a commissioning program/selectivity interaction variable.  
5. Community Designators 
North and Smith (1993), Bowman (1995) and Wielsma (1996) found that aviators 
were more likely to be promoted to O-4 than officers from other occupational categories.  
Four URL categories have been constructed in this thesis to reflect officers serving in 
Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Aviation, and Special Warfare-Operations 
communities.  Similarly, three variables have been constructed to reflect Restricted Line 
Officers in three separate groups: the Supply Corps, Fleet Support, and Restricted Line 
Staff/Other. For the purpose of all retention models, the specific community corresponds 
to the officer’s designator at the time of the O-3 promotion board. O-4 board designators 
could not be determined for officers that left prior to the O-4 board, therefore the last 
recorded designator on record was at the time of the O-3 board.  Community distinctions 
in all promotion models in this thesis correspond to the officer’s designator at the O-4 
board.  
6. Control Variables 
An attempt has been made to control for otherwise non-measurable factors (e.g., 
promotion rate opportunities from year to year, year group size differentials, effects of 
the personnel and equipment drawdown in the early 1990’s) affecting officer promotion 
and retention that are not directly attributable to other explanatory variable in the model.  
To this end, a series of year group dummy variables were constructed and included in all 
promotion and retention models (YRG83-YRG90) to indicate the fiscal year of an 
officer’s promotion board.  No interpretation of magnitude or statistical significance will 
be included in the logit model results.  However, these variables are necessary to account 
for timing of various events and outside economic conditions in an officer’s career.  
These variables also account for the different precepts of promotion boards from one year 
to the next, allowing isolated analysis of the effects of the other explanatory variables in 




D. INTERACTION VARIABLES 
Five variables have been constructed in this thesis to reflect officers that attended 
highly selective colleges and universities.  As noted earlier, Bowman and Mehay (2002) 
found that graduates of top rated schools were more likely to promote at the up-or-out 
point. Interaction of accession source by the TOPCOLL variable that identifies only 
highly selective colleges allows analysis and comparison between USNA graduates and 
accessions of all other programs that attended highly selective schools.  USNA is 
considered a highly selective undergraduate institution, therefore all accessions from 
USNA are represented by USNATOP.  Table 3 identifies the variable name and 
description of these five interaction variables.  The variable USNATOP identifies all 
USNA graduates, while RSTOP identifies ROTC-S graduates of highly selective 
colleges, and RCTOP, OCS TOP, and ECPTOP identify graduates of each 
commissioning program who attended highly selective colleges. 
 
Table 3.   College Selectivity and Commissioning Source Interaction Variables. 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Source/Selectivity Interaction  
USNATOP = 1 IF SOURCE IS USNA; = 0 OTHERWISE  
RSTOP = 1 IF ROTCS AND COLLEGE IS HIGHLY SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
RCTOP = 1 IF ROTCC AND COLLEGE IS HIGHLY SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
OCSTOP = 1 IF OCS AND COLLEGE IS HIGHLY SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
ECPTOP = 1 IF ECP AND COLLEGE IS HIGHLY SELECTIVE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
 
E. ACCOUNTING FOR LATERAL TRANSFERS 
A literature review of all prior econometric studies that identified officers by 
community or designator indicated no prior study had analyzed the effect of changing 
designator on retention and promotion. Therefore, seven variables were included in the 
retention and promotion models to account for lateral transfer of officers from one 
community to another.  These variables are listed in Table 4.  I expect that lateral 
transferring to another community identifies dissatisfaction with initial community 
selection, so than an officer who lateral transfers may be more inclined to stay until the 
O-4 board, and may promote at a higher rate than they would if they had stayed in their 
original community.  The seven variables correspond to changes either into or out of the 
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specified community.  Voluntary lateral transfers could not be distinguished from 
involuntary reassignment due to non-achievement of warfare qualifications or training 
pipeline dropouts.  As was the case with community designator variables, retention 
models reflect designator changes prior to the O-3 board, while promotion models reflect 
designator changes prior to the O-4 board.  
 
Table 4.   Designator Change and Lateral Transfer Variables. 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Lateral Transfer Traits   
LAT_TO_SWO = 1 IF LATERAL FROM OTHER URL TO SWO ; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SWO_2_URLO = 1 IF LATERAL FROM SWO TO OTHER URL; = 0 OTHERWISE 
LAT_TO_SUB = 1 IF LATERAL FROM OTHER URL TO SUB; = 0 OTHERWISE 
SUB_2_URLO = 1 IF LATERAL FROM SUB TO OTHER URL; = 0 OTHERWISE 
LAT_TO_AIR = 1 IF LATERAL FROM OTHER URL TO PILOT OR NFO; = 0 OTHERWISE
AIR_TO_URLO = 1 IF LATERAL FROM PILOT OR NFO TO OTHER URL; = 0 OTHERWISE
URL_LATS = 1 IF LATERAL FROM URL TO RESTRICTED LINE; = 0 OTHERWISE 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. URL RETENTION RATES 
Before developing multivariate models to estimate the effects of accession source 
and other human capital measures on retention and promotion of Naval officers to LCDR, 
we first identify differences in the retention rates of officers from various commissioning 
programs and communities.  This section of the thesis examines retention rates by 
community, accession source, and year group. 
As noted in Chapter II, it maybe inappropriate to combine accession sources or 
officer communities when deriving a statistic to show officer propensity to stay in the 
Navy. (Bowman 1995)  In an attempt to control for this potential aggregation bias, officer 
observations in this thesis have been grouped according to large identifiable categories. 
Preliminary analysis of the Navy’s accession sources suggested the five main categories: 
USNA, ROTC Scholarship, ROTC-Contract, OCS, and ECP.  Previous accession source 
studies have used only three commissioning source distinctions: USNA, ROTC, and 
OCS. (Bowman, 1995 and Parcell, 2001).  The categories ROTC-Contract and ECP were 
added in this thesis to determine whether officers from these commissioning programs 
retain and promote at higher rates than ROTC-Scholarship accessions.  
Within the year groups represented by the data sample (1983-1990), officers 
selected for ECP who participated in ROTC training were an average 4.3 years older at 
the time of commission than their ROTC-Scholarship counterparts.  ECP accessions also 
had an average of 2.9 years active enlisted service, whereas their ROTC-Scholarship 
counterparts had no previous work experience in the Navy. Additional distinctions were 
evident between ROTC-Contract officers and ROTC-Scholarship officers.  ROTC-
Contract accessions paid an average of $10,008 (2002 dollars) per year in undergraduate 
tuition costs, and voluntarily participated in ROTC training in return for a guaranteed 
commission.  In previous studies that analyzed accession source data, officers who 
accessed via ROTC-Contract or ECP were included in a single, all-encompassing ROTC 
category.  However, explanatory factors like higher age, prior service, and attachment to 
military service have all been linked to increased productivity and higher rates of 
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retention in the fleet.  These differences made it necessary to separate ROTC-Contract 
and ECP accessions from ROTC-Scholarship accessions. 
Accessions were further analyzed by individual year group in order to identify 
differences in officer retention prior to, and after, the military draw-down of the early 
1990’s that drastically reduced Navy end strength, total assets (ships, aircraft, bases), and 
command opportunities.  Cross-tabulations of URL retention by commissioning source 
are shown in Table 5 below and the associated graph (Figure 1).  Of the four 
commissioning sources listed, USNA and ROTC-Contract (ROTC-C) show significantly 
higher retention rates to O-4 than ROTC-Scholarship (ROTC-S) and OCS.  The sample 
mean retention rates in Table 5 indicate ROTC-C and USNA accessions stay to the O-4 
board at a rate 7% higher than ROTC-S and OCS.  The rates for each source are:  ROTC-
C= 44.8%, USNA=43.7%, ROTC-S=36.7%, and OCS=35.6%. 
It can also be seen that year groups 1986 and 1987 experienced lower than 
average retention.  This drop in retention can be explained again by the impact of the 
draw-down in 1992 and 1993. Year groups 1986 and 1987 were approximately at the six 
and seven-year point in their careers during this draw-down period, and most had 
completed their minimum service requirement and were free to make a voluntary leave 
decision.  Additionally, officers in the earlier year groups were eligible for voluntary 
separation incentive payments under the VSI (Voluntary Separation Incentive) and SSB 
(Selective Separation Bonus) programs.   
While Table 5 identifies differences in URL retention rates between accession 
sources, comparisons to ECP could not be evaluated due to small sample sizes:  only 108 
ECP observations were contained in the URL sample of 17,135 observations.  These 108 
observations were not uniformly distributed between the eight year groups, therefore 
there was significant variation in ECP retention rates from one year to the next.  Despite 
not being able to evaluate ECP accessions by year group, it is important to note that 50 of 
108 (46.3%) ECP URL’s remained on active service until the O-4 promotion board.   
It is essential to note that a bias may exist in data represented in Table 5. Year 
group 1983 contains only a small percentage (approximately 20%) of the actual officers 
accessed in that year, and no USNA accessions from year group 1983 were contained in 
28 
the data sample.  Only 492 observations from year group 1983 were contained in the 
original data file, while all other year groups contained at least 2,000 observations.  The 
sample mean retention rate for USNA is based only on year groups 1984 through 1990. 
Sample mean retention rates for ROTC-S, ROTC-C, and OCS are based on year groups 
1983 through 1990.  Despite this limitation, multivariate retention analysis will not be 
adversely affected as 1990 is used as the basis for comparison in all logit models 
estimated in Chapter V.  Year group 1990 and all other year groups, with the exception of 
1983, contained representative URL accessions.  
 
Table 5.   URL Retention Frequencies by Source (Year Groups 1983-1990) (% Stay to 
LCDR Promotion Board). 
 
YEAR GROUPS 
SOURCE 83* 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
SAMPLE 
MEAN 
USNA 0 43.4% 47.1% 39.8% 39.2% 41.5% 43.9% 51.4% 43.7% 
ROTC-S 47.6% 38.8% 38.8% 35.6% 32.2% 35.0% 38.0% 41.0% 36.7% 
ROTC-C 43.5% 49.5% 43.8% 38.9% 41.4% 43.1% 51.5% 47.3% 44.8% 
OCS 30.9% 37.1% 33.1% 34.5% 35.8% 33.8% 39.8% 44.5% 35.6% 
 


























Figure 1.   URL Retention Frequencies by Commissioning Source. 
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Table 6 compares URL retention rates among three identifiable community 
categories: Surface (SWO), Submarine (SUB), and Aviation (AIR). In this thesis, the 
Aviation (AIR) category combines pilots and NFO’s.  Combining these two communities 
introduces a potential aggregation bias into the study; however, it is hypothesized that 
these two groups experience similar patterns of retention behavior with regard to length 
of MSR, bonus and pay structures, and command opportunities.  Significantly higher 
investment in human capital made by the Navy during the post-commissioning training 
period of all aviators distinguishes them from the Submarine and Surface Warfare Officer 
communities.  
Similar to ECP accessions, the category Special Warfare-Operations (SPECWO) 
is not represented in the table due to small sample sizes and non-uniform distribution 
across year groups. As a whole, there were 214 observations in the data sample for the 
SPECWO category. As an average retention rate, 105 of 214 (49.1%) Special Warfare 
and Special Operations Officers remained on active duty to the O-4 promotion board. 
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Table 6 and Figure 2 show Submariner retention rates fluctuated between 24.5% 
in 1986 and 32.5% in 1984.  The SUB community had the lowest amount of variation in 
retention rates in the eight year groups listed.  The variation between highest and lowest 
retention rate by community are:  SUB = 8% point, compared to SWO (11.8% points), 
and AIR (18.3% points).  Compared to SWO, the mean SUB retention rate to the O-4 
board is 4.5% points higher.  AIR retention appears very high in comparison to SWO and 
SUB; however, as noted in Chapter III, a substantial and unidentifiable portion of these 
officers have not made a voluntarily stay/leave decision prior to the O-4 board due to 
lengthy MSR obligations.  The sample mean retention rate for AIR is 50.5%; however, 
Bowman (1995) finds that this rate varies greatly according to accession source. His 
analysis of pilots and NFO’s in year groups 1977 through 1985 indicate that the actual 
pilot stay rates to O-4 were: USNA=58.0%, ROTC=54.9%, and OCS=36.4%; (NFO) 
USNA =63.1%, ROTC=65.8%, and OCS=62.9%.  This thesis will identify retention rate 
by source and community as part of the process of determining the required steady state 
flow of accessions in the cost analyses in Chapter VI.  An unbiased and more accurate 
analysis of the aviation community will be presented in part B of this chapter, in 
comparison to URL promotion rates by community. 
Table 6 and Figure 2 show that the Surface community experienced the lowest 
retention rates of the three URL communities.  An important statistic to note here is that 
almost 39% of the Surface Warfare Officers who stayed to the O-4 promotion board 
lateral transferred to SWO from another community after O-3 selection, or failed out of 
their initial training program and entered the surface community prior to O-3 selection.  
Table 7 identifies the 921 officers who transferred into the Surface community and stayed 
to the O-4 board.  Table 8 identifies the 1,130 Surface Warfare Officers who lateral 
transferred to SWO from another URL or Restricted Line community after attaining a 
warfare qualification.  No other URL community experienced lateral transfer gains and 
losses of this magnitude; however, further multivariate analysis of the effect of lateral 
transferring into and out of a specific community is examined in the logit model results in 
Chapter V of this thesis. 
    
Table 6.   URL Retention Frequencies by Community (Year Groups 1983-1990) (% Stay to 
LCDR Promotion Board). 
 
YEAR GROUP 
COMMUNITY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
SAMPLE 
MEAN 
SWO 32.3% 31.1% 26.3% 22.9% 20.5% 21.5% 25.2% 21.5% 24.2% 
SUB 32.4% 32.5% 31.5% 24.9% 25.6% 24.5% 27.5% 28.7% 28.7% 





























Table 7.   SWO Lateral Transfers In. 
 
TRANSFERS TO SWO THAT STAYED 
TO O-4 BOARD 
PROGRAM FAILURES NUMBER
   Nuclear Power 82 
   Aviation-Pilot 64 
   Aviation -NFO 39 
   BUDS/SEAL 1 
   Diver/EOD 4 
LATERAL TRANSFERS   
   Fleet Support 714 
   Other Restricted Line 5 
   Submarine 4 
   Pilot 5 
   NFO 1 
   Diver/EOD 2 
Total Transferred In 921 
 
Table 8.   SWO Lateral Transfers Out. 
 
URL AND RL STAYERS THAT 
STARTED IN SURFACE 
LATERAL TRANSFERS OUT NUMBER
   Pilot 61 
   NFO 43 
   Submariner 19 
   Diver/EOD 26 
   SEAL 17 
   Fleet Support 633 
   Restricted Line Other 331 
Total Transferred Out 1130 
 
B. URL PROMOTION RATES 
Table 9 and Figure 3 compare the promotion rates of URL’s by the four 
categories of commissioning programs (USNA, ROTC-S, ROTC-C, and OCS).  These 
results appear much different than those seen in Table 5.  USNA remains the most 
competitive in the percentage of accessions who promoted to LCDR at first look (sample 
mean = 71.3%). OCS accessions consistently promote at higher rates than accessions 
from ROTC-Scholarship and ROTC-Contract: OCS = 69.4%, ROTC-S= 63.7%, and 
ROTC-C = 63.6%.  An accurate analysis of these OCS accessions would be that they 
32 
have poor retention rates from the time of commission, but that those officers who stay to 
the O-4 board promote at a rate nearly 6 points higher than ROTC-S and ROTC-C.   
 
Table 9.   URL Promotion to LCDR by Accession Source. 
 
YEAR GROUP 
SOURCE 83* 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
SAMPLE 
MEAN 
USNA 0  71.9% 77.8% 70.9% 71.0% 65.0% 66.7% 74.8% 71.3% 
ROTC-S 74.5% 64.0% 67.0% 57.5% 62.1% 60.0% 62.7% 73.0% 63.7% 
ROTC-C 80.0% 55.3% 63.0% 62.9% 58.7% 70.0% 69.2% 61.4% 63.6% 
OCS 73.6% 74.1% 71.0% 68.3% 64.8% 69.9% 67.3% 68.1% 69.4% 
 



























Figure 3.   URL Promotion to LCDR by Accession Source. 
 
Table 10 and Figure 4 compare URL promotion rates for the SWO, AIR, and 
SUB communities. Submarine officers consistently promoted at the highest rate of the 
communities listed in the table, yet the category SPECWO, including both Special 
Warfare and Special Operations Officers promoted at a mean rate of 78.1% (82 of 105 
stayers), a rate slightly higher than that of the SUB community.  The SWO community 
promoted to O-4 at the next highest rate (69.9%), while AIR experienced the lowest 
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promotion rate at 65.1%.  The 13% point difference between SPECWO and AIR 
promotions is large enough to cause concern with community promotion managers; 
however, it is important to note that these promotion rates are calculated with the 
criterion “promoted at first look,” corresponding to “in-zone” or “below-zone.”  “Above-
zone” promotions were calculated as non-promotes.  
 
Table 10.   URL Promotion to LCDR by Community. 
 
YEAR GROUP 
COMMUNITY 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
SAMPLE 
MEAN 
SWO 76.2% 69.7% 69.8% 67.8% 68.9% 69.1% 66.5% 80.7% 69.9% 
SUB 80.0% 75.4% 80.8% 82.2% 77.7% 82.5% 67.3% 80.6% 77.8% 




























Figure 4.   URL Promotion to LCDR by Community. 
 
C. RESTRICTED LINE RETENTION AND PROMOTION RATES 
Due to a significantly smaller sample size than that of the URL data sample, 5,129 
observations corresponding to five accession sources and 16 different communities, 
Restricted Line officer retention and promotion rates were not analyzed by year group. 
Instead, mean retention and promotion rates were calculated in a cross tabulation. These 
sample mean retention and promotion rates are identified in Tables 11 and 12, 
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respectively.  Accession source categories remain the same as URL (USNA, ROTC-S, 
ROTC-C, OCS, and ECP), while three community categories were created for the largest 
populations of officers within the Restricted Line: Fleet Support, Supply Corps, and all 
other Restricted Line Staff officers.   
Table 11 compares the retention rates of Restricted Line officers from different 
accession sources and communities.  ECP, OCS and ROTC-C accessions remain on 
active duty to the O-4 promotion board at rates nearly 15% points higher than accessions 
from USNA and ROTC-S.  While ECP accounts for a very small fraction of the total 
Restricted Line sample (less than 1%), it has the highest retention rate of any of the 
accession sources. Conversely, in terms of overall size, OCS accesses the largest 
proportion of officers of any program, 57% of all Restricted Line officers, and has the 
second highest retention rate (55.2%).   
The mission of the Naval Academy is to provide URL officers.  However, 958 
USNA officers appear in the RL sample.  These USNA RL officers are associated with 
three categories: (1) officers not-physically qualified (NPQ) to service select URL 
designators; (2) URL warfare qualified officers that lateral transferred into RL; or (3) 
officers redesignated to RL after failing out of their initial training programs.    
While Fleet Support and the Supply Corps communities experience nearly the 
same retention rate, they stay to the O-4 promotion board at a rate 10% points less than 
the other Restricted Line Staff officers.  In terms of both accession source and 
community, Table 11 demonstrates that Restricted Line officers stay to the O-4 





















Accession Source     
  USNA 958 401 41.9% 0.366 
  ROTC_S 1,020 399 39.1% 0.364 
  ROTC_C 177 97 54.8% 0.192 
  OCS 2,924 1615 55.2% 0.481 
  ECP 50 28 56.0% 0.104 
Community         
Fleet Support 1,365 627 45.9% 0.431 
Supply Corps 1,980 900 45.5% 0.478 
RL Staff 1,784 1013 56.8% 0.461 
 
Table 12 compares the promotion rates of Restricted Line officers from different 
accession sources and communities.  Similar to the retention rate analysis, ECP 
accessions promoted at the highest rate of any accession source (82.1%), with USNA 
having the second highest promotion rate (81.8%).  Interestingly, USNA’s retention rate 
was 15% points lower than OCS, yet its mean promotion rate is nearly 10% points higher 
than ROTC-S, ROTC-C, and OCS.  Additionally, Fleet Support and Supply Corps 
officers promoted at a rate 7% points less than the other Restricted Line Staff officers in 
the sample.  Table 12 also indicates that Restricted Line officers in the sample promoted 
to O-4 at slightly higher rates than the URL’s.  Restricted Line officer promotion varied 
from approximately 69% to 82%, while URL promotion varied from 65% to 78%. 
 











Accession Source         
   USNA 401 328 81.8% 0.417 
   ROTC_S 399 287 72.0% 0.408 
   ROTC_C 97 69 71.1% 0.186 
   OCS 1615 1147 71.0% 0.499 
   ECP 28 23 82.1% 0.114 
Community         
Fleet Support 627 434 69.2% 0.373 
Supply Corps 900 635 70.6% 0.431 
RL Staff 1013 785 77.5% 0.472 
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D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Tables 13 and 14 compare mean values of each of the analysis variables for the 
URL sample.  These mean values correspond to the percent of total observations with 
that specific characteristic.  Base case characteristics used in the logit retention and 
promotion models are indicated by the bold shaded variable in each category set of 
explanatory variables; (for example, white is the base case for the race/ethnic category.  
Similarly, Tables 15 and 16 compare the mean values of the analysis variables for the 
Restricted Line.       
 
Table 13.   Descriptive Statistics for URL Retention Sample (Sample = 17,134 Accessions). 
 
Variable N Mean (Percent) Std Dev 
Stay04bd 6750 39.4% 0.488 
Leave 10,384 60.6% 0.495 
White 15,895 92.8% 0.588 
Black 593 3.5% 0.183 
Other 646 3.8% 0.19 
Male 16,800 98.1% 0.622 
Female 334 2.0% 0.138 
SNC 9,607 56.1% 0.476 
SWC 57 0.3% 0.058 
MNC 269 1.6% 0.124 
MWC 7201 42.0% 0.494 
Prior Service 573 3.3% 0.179 
No Prior Service 16,561 96.7% 0.613 
Technical Major 10,512 61.4% 0.487 
Non-Tech Major 6,622 38.6% 0.482 
USNA 4,660 27.2% 0.418 
ROTC-S 5,696 33.2% 0.471 
ROTC-C 582 3.4% 0.181 
OCS 6,088 35.5% 0.479 
ECP 108 0.6% 0.079 
NAPC1 17,134 2.037 0.989 
SWO 3,467 20.2% 0.402 
SUB 2,410 14.1% 0.348 
AIR 11,043 64.5% 0.493 
SPECWO 214 1.3% 0.111 
 
Comparisons between Tables 13 and 14 identify notable changes in the sample 
characteristics between the retention sample and the promotion sample.  Of those officers 
who decided to stay to the O-4 board, MWC increased by 4% points and SNC decreased 
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by 5% points from the retention sample to the promotion sample.  That is, more MWC 
officers stayed to the O-4 career point relative to SNC officers. USNA accessions 
increased by 3% points and OCS accessions also decreased by 3% points from the 
retention sample to the promotion sample.  Additionally, the SWO community increased 
by 5% points, while SUB decreased by 3% points and AIR decreased by 2% points from 
the retention to the promotion sample.   
The increase in the population of SWO stayers does not seem consistent with the 
previous analysis of retention rates that showed SWO retention to be the lowest of any 
community.  The difference is in the change in the number and population of officers that 
stayed to the O-4 board.  As noted in Chapter III, the retention sample had a different 
composition from the promotion sample.  While the number of stayers computed by 
comparing initial designator to O-3 designator in the retention sample identified 6,750 
URL’s who stayed to the O-4 board, the promotion sample is based on officers classified 
as URL’s when they appeared at the O-4 board.  So not only are the number of stayers 
different between samples (6,750 compared to 6,627), the composition of the populations 
of officers are different as well.  The retention sample only accounts for officers 
transferring into URL communities between O-1 and O-3.  The promotion sample 
includes all community transfers between O-1 and O-4.  It is a limitation of the data files 
that for all officers who leave the Navy prior to the O-4 board, the designator on record is 
the designator at the last selection board (O-3).  This accounts for the increase in SWO 
population percentages in the promotion sample.  Due to the number of officers lateral 
transferring into and out of the community, SWO gained a greater number of officers 
(who stayed) from other communities than prior-SWO’s who stayed and appeared at the 
O-4 board in another URL or Restricted Line community. The total net transfers in the 







Table 14.   SWO Net Transfers. 
 
SWO NET TRANSFERS (+ GAIN, - 
LOSS) 
Community NUMBER 
 Pilot +8 
 NFO -3 
 Submariner +67 
 Diver/EOD -20 
 SEAL -16 
 Fleet Support +81 
 Restricted Line Other -326 
Total SWO Net Transfers -209 
 
Table 15.   Descriptive Statistics for URL O-4 Promotion Sample (Sample = 6,727 Stayers). 
 
Variable N Mean (Percent) Std Dev 
Promote 4,654 68.9% 0.463 
Not promote 1,973 29.8% 0.327 
White 6,160 93.0% 0.576 
Black 257 3.8% 0.173 
Other 210 3.1% 0.102 
Male 6,512 98.3% 0.566 
Female 115 1.7% 0.079 
SNC 3,375 50.9% 0.433 
SWC 30 0.4% 0.049 
MNC 118 1.7% 0.073 
MWC 3,104 46.1% 0.326 
Prior Service 292 4.3% 0.122 
No Prior Service 6,335 95.6% 0.519 
Technical Major 4,045 59.9% 0.414 
Non-Tech Major 2,582 39.0% 0.364 
USNA 1,917 28.9% 0.326 
ROTCS 2,207 32.7% 0.359 
ROTCC 278 4.1% 0.165 
OCS 2,175 32.2% 0.331 
ECP 50 0.7% 0.068 
NAPC1 6,627 2.127 0.956 
SWO 1,680 25.4% 0.288 
SUB 735 11.1% 0.163 
AIR 4,107 62.0% 0.438 





Table 16.   Descriptive Statistics for RL Retention Sample (Sample = 5,129 Accessions). 
 
Variable N Mean (Percent) Std Dev 
Stay04bd 2,540 49.5% 0.501 
Leave 2,589 50.5% 0.506 
White 4,545 88.6% 0.605 
Black 391 7.6% 0.265 
Other 193 3.8% 0.19 
Male 3,511 68.5% 0.559 
Female 1,618 31.5% 0.465 
SNC 2,809 54.8% 0.494 
SWC 44 0.9% 0.092 
MNC 431 8.4% 0.277 
MWC 1,845 36.0% 0.479 
Prior Service 413 8.1% 0.272 
No Prior Service 4,716 91.9% 0.622 
Technical Major 1,989 38.8% 0.487 
Non-Tech Major 3,140 61.2% 0.556 
USNA 958 18.7% 0.385 
ROTCS 1,020 19.9% 0.399 
ROTCC 177 3.5% 0.183 
OCS 2,924 57.0% 0.495 
ECP 50 1.0% 0.098 
NAPC1 5,129 1.887 0.966 
Fleet Support 1,365 26.6% 0.442 
Supply Corps 1,980 38.6% 0.487 
RL Staff Other 1,784 34.8% 0.465 
 
Comparisons between Tables 16 and 17 identify notable changes in the sample 
characteristics between the retention sample and the promotion sample.  The most 
significant change is the number of Restricted Line officers who appeared at the O-4 
promotion board, as Restricted Line gained nearly 1,000 URL lateral transfers, 
accounting for the difference between 2,540 stayers in the retention sample compared to 
3,536 stayers in the promotion sample.  Of those who decided to stay to the O-4 board, 
24.3% were female, compared to a 31.5% female population in the original retention 
sample.  That is, the proportion of female officers who stayed to the O-4 board decreased 
relative to the proportion of females who were accessed in the RL communities.  The 
percentage of officers classified as married with children (MWC) increased by 6% points 
from the retention sample to the promotion sample. The percentage of officers with a 
technical major increased from 38.8% in the original model to 44.8% of those officers 
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who stayed to the O-4 board.  Additionally, OCS accessions increased by nearly six 
percent from the retention to the promotion sample, while USNA and ROTC-S 
accessions both decreased by 3% points. Another distinction in community percentages is 
evident as Restricted Line Staff officers increased by 5% points with respect to the Fleet 
Support and Supply Corps communities in the sample of officers who stayed to the O-4 
promotion board.  
 
Table 17.   Descriptive Statistics for RL O-4 Promotion Sample (Sample = 3,536 Stayers). 
 
Variable N Mean (Percent) Std Dev 
Promote 2,581 73.0% 0.444 
Not Promoted 955 27.0% 0.438 
White 3,091 87.4% 0.593 
Black 294 8.3% 0.276 
Other 151 4.3% 0.202 
Male 2,677 75.7% 0.542 
Female 859 24.3% 0.429 
SNC 1,802 51.0% 0.537 
SWC 36 1.0% 0.101 
MNC 204 5.8% 0.233 
MWC 1,494 42.3% 0.494 
Prior Service 348 9.8% 0.298 
No Prior Service 3,188 90.2% 0.619 
Technical Major 1,585 44.8% 0.497 
Non-Tech Major 1,951 55.2% 0.539 
USNA 401 11.3% 0.385 
ROTCS 756 21.4% 0.411 
ROTCC 132 3.7% 0.189 
OCS 1,932 54.6% 0.498 
ECP 41 1.2% 0.107 
NAPC1 3,536 1.939 0.943 
Fleet Support 624 17.6% 0.381 
Supply Corps 896 25.3% 0.435 
RL Staff Other 2,016 57.0% 0.452 
 
E. SUMMARY 
Analysis of the retention and promotion rates for both URL and Restricted line 
officers, as well as the descriptive statistics in this chapter, give some preliminary 
indication of the relationship between the explanatory variables, most importantly 
accession source, and the retention and promotion outcomes.  USNA accessions were 
more likely to stay and promote in both URL and Restricted Line communities.  OCS 
41 
accessions were less likely to stay, but more likely to promote than ROTC-S accessions 
in URL communities.  In the Restricted Line communities, OCS accessions were more 
likely to stay and more likely to promote than ROTC-S.  ROTC-Contract officers were 
more likely to stay in the URL communities, but less likely to promote than the other 
accession sources in both the URL and Restricted Line communities. Finally, ROTC-S 
officers, on average, were the least likely to stay or promote in both the URL and 
Restricted Line communities, in particular, compared to accessions who attended the 
similar pre-commissioning training programs: ECP and ROTC-Contract.  While these 
descriptive statistics are illuminating, results of multivariate analysis in Chapter V and 
steady state accession costs in Chapter VI will provide more insight into which 
commissioning programs are most cost-effective for the Navy.   
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V. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Multivariate modeling isolates the effect of a given explanatory variable while 
holding the effects of other explanatory variables constant.  This thesis will use the 
logistic regression (logit) model to predict the probability that a binary dependent 
variable has a value of 1.  All explanatory variables used in the logit models have been 
coded as a 0 or 1 as defined in Chapter III, with the exception of the single ordinal 
variable for undergraduate GPA (NAPC1). 
A. RETENTION RESULTS FOR URL 
Initial analysis of the URL and Restricted Line samples uses a basic logit model 
to estimate the effects of accession source on the retention of Navy officers to the O-4 
promotion board.  In this basic model, demographic explanatory variables and variables 
for technical major, NAPC1, and prior service have been included with the accession 
source variables.  Table XXVII provides the results of this initial model for URL officers.  
The computed partial effect in the 3rd column is the percentage point change in the 
dependent variable (STAY04BD) due to a change in an explanatory variable from 0 to 1.  
The partial effect for GPA reflects a one-unit increase from the mean value.  This 
explanatory variable has an inverse relationship to the dependent variable (STAY04 BD), 
as a one-unit increase in the variable GPA reflects a decrease in the value of GPA by one 
letter grade, or approximately .4 tenths of a point.  Percentage change from the base 
predicted probability of each model has also been computed in the 4th column of each 
results table.  This value indicates the percentage increase or decrease in the probability 
an officer stays to the O-4 promotion from the baseline predicted probability.  
Additionally, statistically significant variables are annotated by an asterisk.  
The results of model 1 indicate that URL officers from ROTC-S and OCS are less 
likely to stay to the O-4 board than USNA officers.  The ROTC-C and OCS variables are 
statistically insignificant indicating no difference in retention between these two sources 
and USNA.  Officers with technical degrees are 3.9% less likely to stay than officers who 
do not have technical degrees.  Officers with lower GPA’s are 6.7% more likely to stay 
than those with a mean APC.  Officers with prior service are 22.5% more likely to stay 
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than officers with no prior enlisted service.  Female URL’s are 10% less likely to stay 
than males, and officers in the same race/ethnicity category are 20% less likely to stay 
than whites.  As seen in previous officer retention and promotion studies (Bowman and 
Mehay, 2001), family status has a definite impact on the decision to stay to O-4 
promotion board:  SWC, MNC, and MWC all increase the probability an officer stays to 
the O-4 board compared to SNC (single no children); SWC (single with children) 
increases the probability to stay by as much as 34.3%. 
 
Table 18.   Basic Retention Model for URL Officers. 
 
 











Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.1764** .0411 -.043 -9.2% 
   ROTC Contract .0577 .0906 .014 3.0% 
   OCS -.3193** .0426 -.078 -16.7% 
   ECP -.3411 .2182 -.083 -17.8% 
Technical Major -.0721** .0334 -.018 -3.9% 
NAPC1 (GPA) .1237** .0168 .031 6.7% 
Prior Service .2763** .1094 .105 22.5% 
Black .0315 .0867 .008 1.7% 
Other -.3814** .0871 -.093 -20.0% 
Female -.1929* .1196 -.048 -10.3% 
SWC .6511** .2693 .160 34.3% 
MNC .2788** .1279 .070 15.0% 
MWC .2761** .0324 .069 14.8% 
N 17,134       
Base Predicted Probability .466       
Intercept -.3872       
-2LogL 22,644.9       
Chi-Sq 331.2       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 




Table 19 lists the results of model 2 for URL officers.  This model includes the 
explanatory variables from the basic model, variables for warfare community, and 
interaction variables that compare ROTC-S, ROTC-C, and OCS accessions who attended 
highly selective colleges to USNA graduates.  This set of interaction variables attempts to 
control for differences in college quality among accession sources.  The partial effects 
indicate that non-selective ROTC-S and ROTC-C graduates are more likely to stay than 
USNA, while non-selective OCS accessions are 4.4% less likely to stay than USNA.  
When comparing the retention of accessions that attended colleges of the same quality 
and selectivity, ROTC-S (RSTOP) was 25.2% less likely to stay than USNA and OCS 
(OCSTOP) was 13.8% less likely to stay than USNA.  The net effect is that ROTC-S is 
15.6% (25.2%-9.6%) less likely to stay and OCS is 9.4% (13.8%-4.4%) less likely to 
stay.  Officers with lower GPA and prior service continued to be more likely to stay than 
officers with the mean APC and no prior service. Black officers were 9.6% more likely to 
stay than white officers, while OTHER was 17.5% less likely to stay than WHITE.  
Female officers were 17.9% less likely to stay than male officers.  SWC, MNC, and 
MWC continued to be more likely to stay than SNC in model 2 as well.  In terms of URL 
community comparisons, SPECWO was the only variable that was statistically 
significant, and was 16.2% more likely to stay than AIR. 
B. RETENTION RESULTS FOR RESTRICTED LINE 
Tables 20 and 21 provide the results of the same two retention models used in part 
A, but estimated for RL officers.  The results in Table 20 show that ROTC-C (28.5%) 
and OCS (33.2%) are more likely to stay than USNA.  Prior service has the greatest 
impact on retention to O-4 of any variable in the model: RL officers with prior service are 
39.6% more likely to stay than RL officers with no prior service.  Technical majors are 
less likely to stay than non-technical majors, and similar to the URL results, officers with 
lower GPA’s are more likely to stay to the O-4 promotion board.  Other similarities to the 
URL results are that SWC and MWC are more likely to stay than SNC.  Quite different 
than the URL results, however, is that female officers in the RL sample are 27% more 
likely to stay than males, and Black officers are 22.6% more likely to stay than whites.  
Fleet Support (37.9%) and Supply Corps (34.4%) community members were less likely 
to stay than the other RL Staff officers in the sample. 
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Table 19.   Retention Model 2 for URL Officers. 
 
 











Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship .1765** .0468 .044 9.6% 
   ROTC Contract .2784** .0954 .069 15.1% 
   OCS -.0797* .0454 -.020 -4.4% 
   ECP -.2042 .2222 -.050 -10.9% 
Technical Major .0223 .0348 .006 1.3% 
NAPC1 (GPA) .0444** .0181 .011 2.4% 
Prior Service .4955** .1006 .123 26.9% 
Black .1762** .0887 .044 9.6% 
Other -.3308** .0882 -.080 -17.5% 
Female -.3395** .1205 -.082 -17.9% 
SWC .6964** .2751 .171 37.4% 
MNC .2628** .1297 .066 14.4% 
MWC .2409** .0330 .060 13.1% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) -.4838** .0606 -.115 -25.2% 
   RCTOP  -.0036 .3326 -.001 -0.2% 
   OCSTOP  -.2575** .0881 -.063 -13.8% 
Community (compared to Aviation)         
   SWO -.8087 .0457 -.184 -40.9% 
   SUB -.7625 .0563 -.175 -38.3% 
   SPECWO .2960** .1419 .074 16.2% 
N 17,134       
Base Predicted Probability .457       
Intercept -.2643       
-2LogL 22,102.2       
Chi-Sq 873.9       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 





Table 20.   Retention Model 1 for RL Officers. 
 
 











Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship .0393 .0988 .010 2.5% 
   ROTC Contract .4696** .1733 .116 28.5% 
   OCS .5462** .0860 .135 33.2% 
   ECP .0165 .3264 .004 1.0% 
Technical Major -.2106** .0665 -.050 -12.3% 
NAPC1 (GPA) .1138** .0324 .028 6.9% 
Prior Service .6497** .1242 .161 39.6% 
Black .3739** .1140 .092 22.6% 
Other .1005 .1527 .024 5.9% 
Female .4453** .0872 .110 27.0% 
SWC .5672* .3368 .140 34.4% 
MNC -.1693 .1126 -.040 -9.8% 
MWC .3494** .0645 .086 21.1% 
Community (compared to Staff/Other)         
   Fleet Support -.7042** .0947 -.154 -37.9% 
   Supply Corps -.6319** .0734 -.140 -34.4% 
N 5,129       
Base Predicted Probability .407       
Intercept -.5932       
-2LogL 6,790.5       
Chi-Sq 319.3       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 
   * = significant at the 90% level; ** = significant at the 95% level. 
 
Results in Table 21 indicate ROTC-S, ROTC-C, and OCS are all more likely to 
stay than USNA officers.  However, when comparing accessions that attended colleges of 
the same quality and selectivity, ROTC-S accessions (RSTOP) are 29.6% less likely to 
stay than USNA, and OCS accessions (OCSTOP) are 21.9% less likely to stay than 
USNA.  Since USNA predominantly produces URL officers, a substantial portion of the 
USNA RL officers are prior URL’s.  The results of the college selectivity variables may 
also be attributed to the impact of either a warfare qualification or URL training on RL 
retention.  To this end, USNA graduates are more likely to stay that selective accessions 
47 
from ROTC-S and OCS.  The impact of all other explanatory variables on RL retention in 
the expanded model are consistent with the previous results in Table 21.  
 
Table 21.   Retention Model 2 for RL Officers. 
 












Accession Source (compared to USNA)       
   ROTC Scholarship .2297** .1099 .057 13.7% 
   ROTC Contract .4759** .1732 .118 28.4% 
   OCS .5903** .0870 .146 35.1% 
   ECP .0260 .3262 .006 1.4% 
Technical Major -.2048** .0667 -.049 -11.8% 
NAPC1 (GPA) .1167** .0326 .029 7.0% 
Prior Service .6370** .1243 .158 38.0% 
Black .3408** .1141 .084 20.2% 
Other .0814 .1527 .020 4.8% 
Female .4460** .0867 .111 26.7% 
SWC .5469* .3370 .136 32.7% 
MNC -.1669 .1130 -.040 -9.6% 
MWC .3355** .0647 .083 20.0% 
Source *Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) -.5432 .1412 -.123 -29.6% 
   OCSTOP  -.3927 .1368 -.091 -21.9% 
Community (compared to Staff/Other)         
   Fleet Support -.7131** .0952 -.157 -37.7% 
   Supply Corps -.6387** .0738 -.143 -34.4% 
N 5,129       
Base Predicted Probability .416       
Intercept -.5589       
-2LogL 6,767.1       
Chi-Sq 342.7       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 
   * = significant at the 90% level; ** = significant at the 95% level. 
  
 
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter II, the sign and statistical significance 
of all the explanatory variables in Tables 18-21 seem reasonable, given the noted 
differences between the URL and RL communities. One notable exception is the impact 
of accession source in the RL communities.  Unlike the results in the URL communities, 
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officers accessed in ROTC-S, ROTC-C and OCS are substantially more likely to stay to 
the O-4 promotion board than USNA accessions.  USNA appears to retain URL officers 
at a much higher rate communities than it does RL officers.  These differences may be 
attributed in some way to the fact that USNA predominantly produces URL officers.  
With the exception of the less than 2% of each graduating class accepted for post-
graduate scholarship programs, officers accessed from USNA must be medically 
disqualified from serving in a URL community in order to service select a restricted line 
community.  Currently, all USNA accessions service select under this criterion. Male 
USNA accessions represented in the data in year groups 1983 though 1990 service 
selected with this criterion as well.  However, female USNA accessions in year groups 
1983-1990 were excluded from the medical disqualification criterion and were eligible to 
select RL communities. Conversely, accessions from ROTC and OCS were eligible to 
choose either URL or RL communities.  Perhaps more USNA accessions would have 
chosen career paths in RL communities if given the opportunity.  This freedom of choice 
may both impact the decision to stay to the O-4 board and reduce the number of lateral 
transfers from URL to RL.  It is important to note that USNA males account for 
approximately 53% of the 904 URL’s in the data sample that lateral transferred to RL 
communities and stayed to the O-4 promotion board.  
C. PROMOTION RESULTS FOR URL 
A series of models were used to estimate the effects of accession source on 
promotion to O-4 for URL officers.  Similar to the basic retention model, a basic  
promotion model was used on the sample of all URL officers who stayed to the O-4 
board.  Table 22 indicates the results of the basic promotion model estimated for the 
pooled sample of URL officers.  ROTC-S is 8.1% less likely to stay than USNA.  No 
other accession source variables were statistically significant in this model.  Additionally, 
officers with technical majors were 3.1% more likely to promote to O-4 than officers who 
were non-technical majors.  Officers with lower GPA’s were 3.4% less likely to promote 
than officers with the mean GPA.  Officers in the other race/ethnicity category were 7.3% 
less likely to promote than whites.  Officers in the MWC family status category were 3% 
more likely to promote to O-4 than officers in the SNC category.  Due to the lack of 
statistically significant accession source variables and the hypothesis that we should 
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expect to observe promotion differences within each URL community, separate 
promotion models were estimated for each URL community.  
D. PROMOTION RESULTS FOR SWO 
Table 23 indicates the promotion results for Surface Warfare Officers.  ROTC-S 
and OCS were less likely to promote to O-4 than USNA.  In terms of undergraduate 
academic experience, having a technical major increases the probability of promoting by 
3.3%, and having a lower GPA decreases the probability of promoting by 4.3%.  The 
race/ethnicity variable OTHER is the only demographic variable in the model that is 
statistically significant.  Officers in the other race/ethnicity category are 8.6% less likely 
to promote than white officers who stayed to the O-4 board.  
The results in Table 24 for SWO’s indicate ROTC-S and OCS are less likely to 
promote than USNA, yet RSTOP (6.2%) and OCSTOP (10.8%) are more likely to 
promote than USNA graduates.  This signifies a substantial difference in the promotion 
probabilities of accessions from the same source that attend different quality colleges and 
universities. ROTC-S and OCS as a whole are not as competitive as USNA, yet 
individuals accessed through those programs who attended elite colleges and universities 
promote at a higher rate than USNA graduates. This reemphasizes the impact and 
economic return to attending elite, public and private universities. (Bowman and Mehay, 




Table 22.   Basic Promotion Model for URL Officers. 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 URL OFFICERS 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.2924** .0683 -.060 -8.1% 
   ROTC Contract -.1670 .1399 -.033 -4.4% 
   OCS -.0414 .0727 -.008 -1.1% 
   ECP .6293 .3998 .102 13.7% 
Technical Major .1239** .0560 .023 3.1% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.1290** .0288 -.025 -3.4% 
Prior Service -.1331 .1470 -.026 -3.5% 
Black -.0370 .1385 -.007 -0.9% 
Other -.2632* .1484 -.054 7.3% 
Female .1610 .2134 .030 4.0% 
SWC -.4929 .3758 -.105 -14.2% 
MNC .3003 .2171 .053 7.1% 
MWC .1167** .0560 .022 3.0% 
N 6,750       
Base Predicted Probability .742       
Intercept 1.329       
-2LogL 8,263.9       
Chi-Sq 99.5       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 





Table 23.   Basic Promotion Model for SWO Officers. 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 












Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.4600** .1385 -.075 -9.0% 
   ROTC Contract .0548 .2542 -.008 -1.0% 
   OCS -.3199* .1645 -.050 -6.0% 
Technical Major .2012* .1132 .027 3.3% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.2342** .0634 -.036 -4.3% 
Prior Service -.1214 .2600 -.018 -2.2% 
Black -.2681 .1861 -.041 -4.9% 
Other -.4403* .2401 -.071 -8.6% 
Female .2932 .4764 .038 4.6% 
MNC .5505 .4659 .064 7.7% 
MWC .1694 .1144 .022 2.7% 
N 1,680       
Base Predicted Probability .830       
Intercept 2.134       
-2LogL 1,976.4       
Chi-Sq 55.4       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 




Table 24.   Promotion Model for SWO Officers (with Interaction Variables). 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 











Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.5244** .1456 -.088 -10.7% 
   ROTC Contract .0477 .2588 .007 0.8% 
   OCS -.3509** .1707 -.056 -6.8% 
Technical Major .1902* .1138 .026 3.1% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.2242** .0637 -.035 -4.2% 
Prior Service -.2441 .2709 -.038 -4.6% 
Black -.2729 .1876 -.043 -5.2% 
Other -.4044* .2405 -.066 -8.0% 
Female .2257 .4796 .030 3.6% 
MNC .5355 .4679 .064 7.7% 
MWC .1704 .1150 .023 2.8% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) .4052* .2168 .051 6.2% 
   OCSTOP .8204* .4355 .089 10.8% 
N 1,680       
Base Predicted Probability .826       
Intercept 2.087       
-2LogL 2,031.8       
Chi-Sq 69.3       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 
   * = significant at the 90% level; ** = significant at the 95% level. 
  
 
After adding the lateral transfer variables LAT_TO_SWO and SWO_2_URLO to 
the SWO promotion model in Table 25 there are notable changes in the partial effects of 
the demographic variables BLACK and MWC.  BLACK becomes statistically significant 
and indicates BLACKS are 4.9% less likely to promote to O-4.  MWC also becomes 
statistically significant in this model and shows that officers who are married with 
children are 4.3% more likely to promote than SNC.  ROTC-S and OCS remain less 
likely to promote than USNA, while RSTOP is still more likely to promote than USNA.  
The LAT_TO_SWO variable is statistically significant and accounts for officers who 
appeared at the O-4 board in the SWO community after starting their career in a different 
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URL or RL community.  These officers are 4.5% less likely to promote to O-4 than 
SWO’s who began their career and remained in the SWO community.   
These results support the value of the initial Division Officer sea tours and 
increased years of experience in a community prior to selection for O-4.  SWO officers 
average nearly 6.5 years “at-sea,” OJT (on-the-job-training) prior to the O-4 promotion 
point.  Nearly all shiphandling proficiency and battle-group operations experience occur 
during the division officer and department head sea tours.  High levels of performance in 
these areas remain critical to SWO fitness report rankings.  Unlike the level of training 
that occurs in flight school, nuclear power school, and BUDS (Basic Underwater 
Demolitions School), SWO proficiency occurs more in the fleet than in the training 
pipeline.  Shiphandling and TAO (Tactical Action Officer) training have been simulated 
in various SWOS courses in Newport, Rhode Island.  However, simulated training is no 
replacement for real ship-based operations.  In contrast, Aviation officers spend 
approximately two years flying various aircraft before they report to their initial 
squadrons.  Submarine officers spend in excess of two years in nuclear power school and 
prototype school operating nuclear reactors before they report to their first submarines.  
Officers that lateral transfer into those communities get the same level of experience 
because every officer attends the same pipeline training.  Additionally, success in the 
initial tours can be generalized as follows. Aviators need to be expert pilots and 
equipment operators; these skills can be acquired in the training pipeline.  Submariners 
require expert knowledge of nuclear power and submarine-based engineering 
configurations; these skills also can be learned in the training pipeline.  SWO’s need to be 
good shiphandlers and have critical understanding of engineering, damage control, and 
tactical operations; these skills are attained in the fleet, not in the training pipeline.  To 
this end, it is hypothesized that lateral transfers into the Aviation and Submarine 
communities will be as likely or even more likely to promote to O-4 than officers who 
start in those two communities, while officers that lateral transfer into the Surface 




Table 25.   Promotion Model for SWO Officers (with Lateral Transfer Variables). 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 











Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.4875** .1264 -.082 -10.0% 
   ROTC Contract -.0291 .2189 -.004 -0.5% 
   OCS -.4725** .1528 -.079 -9.6% 
Technical Major .2001** .0947 .027 3.3% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.2459** .0527 -.039 -4.7% 
Prior Service .0571 .2195 .008 1.0% 
Black -.2567* .1596 -.040 -4.9% 
Other -.3311 .1963 -.053 -6.4% 
Female .2987 .3531 .039 4.7% 
MNC .3040 .3537 .040 4.9% 
MWC .2644** .0952 .035 4.3% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) .3693** .1753 .048 5.8% 
   OCSTOP .1822 .3071 .025 3.0% 
Lateral Transfer         
   LAT_TO_SWO -.2337** .1105 -.037 -4.5% 
   SWO_2_URLO .0163 .1906 .002 0.2% 
N 2,542       
Base Predicted Probability .823       
Intercept 2.108       
-2LogL 2,874.1       
Chi-Sq 70.2       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 
   * = significant at the 90% level; ** = significant at the 95% level. 
  
 
E. PROMOTION RESULTS FOR AVIATION 
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The results in Tables 26 and 27 indicate that the partial effects of ROTC-S for 
Aviation officers are consistent with those of the SWO community.  Table 26 shows that 
ROTC-S and ROTC-C are both less likely to promote to O-4 than USNA.  MWC also 
remains 3.3% more likely to promote than SNC.  Table 27 includes the college selectivity 
interaction variables with the basic promotion model.  ROTC-S is the only statistically 
significant variable; ROTC-S is 4.6% less likely to promote to O-4 than USNA. 
The results in Table 28 indicate that adding the lateral transfer variables to the 
second promotion model impact the partial effects of the other explanatory variables for 
accession source, technical major, and GPA.  ROTC-S remains less likely to promote 
than USNA, but ROTC-C is 1.4% more likely to promote than USNA in this model. 
Officers with technical majors are 3.3% more likely to promote to O-4 than officers with 
non-technical majors.  As hypothesized in Chapter II, officers with lower GPA’s were 
2.9% less likely to promote to O-4.  Finally, unlike the results for the SWO community, 
LAT_TO_AIR is 10.2% more likely to promote to O-4 than officers who began their 
careers in aviation.   
These results support the previous hypothesis in Part D about pipeline training 
and reemphasize the value of earning a URL warfare qualification prior to lateral 
transferring to pilot or NFO designators.  The increase in the probability of promotion for 
these lateral transfers also disproves the belief that having fewer tours in aviation billets 




Table 26.   Basic Promotion Model for Aviation Officers. 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR AVIATION OFFICERS; 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.2012** .0859 -.044 -6.3% 
   ROTC Contract -.2963* .1799 -.065 -9.2% 
   OCS .1368 .0899 .028 4.0% 
Technical Major .0975 .0696 .020 2.8% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.0606 .0387 -.013 -1.8% 
Prior Service -.0822 .1940 -.017 -2.4% 
Black .3532 .2459 .068 9.7% 
Other -.1612 .2049 -.035 -5.0% 
Female .1555 .2439 .031 4.4% 
MNC .2730 .2736 .054 7.7% 
MWC .1134* .0681 .023 3.3% 
N 4,107       
Base Predicted Probability .703       
Intercept .9937       
-2LogL 5,205.2       
Chi-Sq 58.4       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 






Table 27.   Promotion Model for Aviation Officers (with Interaction Variables) 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR AVIATION OFFICERS; 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.1508* .0933 -.032 -4.6% 
   ROTC Contract -.2919 .1866 -.064 -9.1% 
   OCS .1446 .0925 .029 4.1% 
Technical Major .1047 .0700 .021 3.0% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.0589 .0388 -.012 -1.7% 
Prior Service -.1553 .2103 -.033 -4.7% 
Black .3522 .2464 .068 9.7% 
Other -.1727 .2051 -.037 -5.3% 
Female .1626 .2443 .033 4.7% 
MNC .2569 .2739 .051 7.3% 
MWC .1089 .0683 .022 3.1% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) -.1627 .1259 -.035 -5.0% 
   OCSTOP .0366 .2148 .008 1.1% 
N 4,107       
Base Predicted Probability .704       
Intercept .9888       
-2LogL 5,202.7       
Chi-Sq 60.9       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 






Table 28.   Promotion Model for Aviation Officers (with Lateral Transfer Variables). 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR AVIATION OFFICERS; 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.2019** .0901 -.044 -6.3% 
   ROTC Contract -.3236** .1699 .010 1.4% 
   OCS .0823 .0889 .017 2.4% 
Technical Major .1115* .0673 .023 3.3% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.0948** .0373 -.020 -2.9% 
Prior Service .0294 .1895 .006 0.9% 
Black .2449 .2211 .049 7.0% 
Other -.3024 .1896 -.067 -9.6% 
Female .2316 .2333 .046 6.6% 
MNC .1992 .2575 .040 5.7% 
MWC .1212* .0657 .025 3.6% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) -.1889 .1214 -.041 -5.9% 
   OCSTOP .0483 .2082 .010 1.4% 
Lateral Transfer         
   LAT_TO_AIR .3670* .2058 .071 10.2% 
   AIR_2_URLO .1865 .1365 .038 5.4% 
N 4,429       
Base Predicted Probability .698       
Intercept 1.047       
-2LogL 5,599.0       
Chi-Sq 67.5       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 




F. PROMOTION RESULTS FOR SUBMARINE 
Results of the basic promotion model for submarine officers in the data sample 
are shown in Table 29.  It is important to note that no ROTC-C officers or females were 
contained in the sample of submarine officers who stayed to the O-4 promotion board.  
Therefore, no inferences about the relationship or impact of these variables on promotion 
in the submarine community can be drawn.  Despite this limitation, Table 29 indicates 
that OCS officers are 6.6% less likely to promote to O-4 than USNA.  Similar to the 
results for Aviation officers, a lower GPA is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of promotion.  The race variable BLACK is statistically significant and has the largest 
impact of any explanatory variables in the model on the probability of promotion; 
BLACK is 25.4% less likely to promote than WHITE.  However, this result is 
questionable as there are only eight observations in the sample. 
Despite including the college quality interaction variables in the second 
promotion model, the results in Table 30 are consistent with the results of the basic 
promotion model.  When the lateral transfer variables are included in Table 31, GPA and 
LAT_TO_SUB are the only explanatory variables that are statistically significant.  A 
lower GPA decreases the probability of promoting to O-4 by 5.4%, while LAT_TO_SUB 
is 10.1% more likely to promote to O-4 than officers directly accessed into the submarine 
community.  Similar to the results Aviation officers, the 193 officers that lateral 
transferred into the submarine community promoted to O-4 at a higher rate than the other 
submarine officers that stayed to the O-4 board.  These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis developed in PART D about the value of nuclear power school and prototype 




Table 29.   Basic Model for Submarine Officers. 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR SUBMARINE OFFICERS 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.1182 .2415 -.014 -1.6% 
   OCS -.4423* .2354 -.058 -6.6% 
Technical Major -.1736 .3640 -.021 -2.4% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.2260** .1144 -.027 -3.1% 
Prior Service -.0861 .4438 -.010 -1.1% 
Black -1.3036* .7409 -.222 -25.4% 
Other -.6886 .6200 -.097 -11.1% 
MNC .0873 .6916 .009 1.0% 
MWC -.0549 .1894 -.006 -0.7% 
N 735       
Base Predicted Probability .873       
Intercept 2.1857       
-2LogL 743.2       
Chi-Sq 24.4       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 






Table 30.   Promotion Model for Submarine Officers (with Interaction Variables). 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR SUBMARINE OFFICERS 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.1624 .2863 -.012 -1.4% 
   OCS -.5011** .2494 -.065 -7.4% 
Technical Major -.2045 .3718 -.024 -2.7% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.2360** .1156 -.028 -3.2% 
Prior Service -.1508 .5633 -.017 -1.9% 
Black -1.2932* .7447 -.216 -24.7% 
Other -.7319 .6235 -.103 -11.8% 
MNC .1067 .6943 .011 1.3% 
MWC -.0508 .1898 -.006 -0.7% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) .1164 .3733 .012 1.4% 
   OCSTOP .3707 .4107 .035 4.0% 
N 735       
Base Predicted Probability .876       
Intercept 2.228       
-2LogL 742.2       
Chi-Sq 25.4       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 





Table 31.   Promotion Model for Submarine Officers (with Lateral Transfer Variables). 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR SUBMARINE OFFICERS 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship .0261 .2638 .005 0.7% 
   OCS -.2760 .2400 -.056 -7.5% 
Technical Major -.0677 .2810 -.013 -1.7% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.2016** .0989 -.040 -5.4% 
Prior Service .0145 .3893 .003 0.4% 
Black -.7134 .5260 -.157 -21.1% 
Other -.5573 .4759 -.119 -16.0% 
MNC .4220 .6711 .072 9.7% 
MWC .0199 .1640 .004 0.5% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) .1940 .3283 .035 4.7% 
   OCSTOP .4633 .3797 .078 10.5% 
Lateral Transfer         
   LAT_TO_SUB .4411* .2695 .075 10.1% 
   SUB_2_URLO .3091 .2150 .054 7.3% 
N 963       
Base Predicted Probability .743       
Intercept 1.477       
-2LogL 973.7       
Chi-Sq 23.5       
   
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 




G. PROMOTION RESULTS FOR RESTRICTED LINE  
The results in Table 32 for RL Officers support the previous interpretation of the 
impact of accession source on promotion from the preliminary analysis of promotion 
rates in Chapter IV.  ROTC-S, ROTC-C, and OCS are all less likely to promote to O-4 
than USNA.  Table 32 also indicates prior service is statistically significant for the first 
time in any of the promotion models; RL officers with prior service are 5.9% more likely 
to promote to O-4 than officers with no prior service.  The effect of a lower GPA in this 
model is consistent with the URL promotion models.  Additionally, Table 32 compares 
the probability of promotion for each of the three RL categories.  Fleet Support officers 
are 7.8% less likely to promote than RL Staff officers, and Supply Corps officers are 4% 
less likely to promote than RL Staff officers  
Table 33 includes both the college selectivity interaction variables and the 
variable URL_LATS, corresponding to prior URL officers that lateral transferred into the 
RL community after O-3 selection.  The impacts of accession source, GPA, prior service, 
and community are consistent with the previous model.  Additionally, the impact of 
URL_LATS is positive and statistically significant.  Similar to the URL communities, it 
reemphasizes the value of a URL warfare qualification in the RL communities.  The 904 
URL lateral transfers into RL communities are 11.4% more likely to promote to O-4 than 




Table 32.   Basic Promotion Model for RL Officers. 
 
 
PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR RESTRICTED LINE OFFICERS 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.4329** .1296 -.078 -9.7% 
   ROTC Contract -.4197* .2222 -.075 -9.3% 
   OCS -.6018** .1188 -.112 -14.0% 
   ECP .0121 .4557 .002 0.2% 
Technical Major -.0847 .0867 -.014 -1.7% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.1547** .0435 -.026 -3.2% 
Prior Service .3287** .1470 .047 5.9% 
Black -.0987 .1404 -.016 -2.0% 
Other -.2420 .1812 -.041 -5.1% 
Female .0777 .1494 .012 1.5% 
SWC -.4606 .3556 -.083 -10.3% 
MNC .0278 .1753 .004 0.5% 
MWC .0431 .0845 .007 0.9% 
Community (compared to Staff/Other)         
   Fleet Support -.3607** .1621 -.063 -7.8% 
   Supply Corps -.1892* .0992 -.032 -4.0% 
N 3,536       
Base Predicted Probability .803       
Intercept 1.703       
-2LogL 4,046.8       
Chi-Sq 78.6       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 









PROBABILITY OF PROMOTING TO O-4 FOR RESTRICTED LINE OFFICERS 







(% PT CHANGE) 
%CHANGE 
FROM BASE
Accession Source (compared to USNA)         
   ROTC Scholarship -.3880** .1404 -.068 -8.5% 
   ROTC Contract -.4189* .2222 -.074 -9.2% 
   OCS -.5890** .1204 -.109 -13.6% 
   ECP .0175 .4558 .003 0.4% 
Technical Major -.0834 .0867 -.013 -1.6% 
NAPC1 (GPA) -.1528** .0436 -.025 -3.1% 
Prior Service .3244** .1473 .046 5.7% 
Black -.1053 .1405 -.017 -2.1% 
Other -.2486 .1813 -.042 -5.2% 
Female .0813 .1496 .012 1.5% 
SWC -.4696 .3557 -.084 -10.4% 
MNC .0280 .1754 .004 0.5% 
MWC .0379 .0847 .006 0.7% 
Community (compared to Staff/Other)         
   Fleet Support -.3667** .1625 -.064 -8.0% 
   Supply Corps -.1933* .0994 -.032 -4.0% 
Source*Selectivity Interaction         
   RSTOP (compared to USNA) -.1499 .1792 -.025 -3.1% 
   OCSTOP -.1080 .1204 -.018 -2.2% 
Lateral Transfer         
   URL_LATS .5266** .1253 .092 11.4% 
N 3,536       
Base Predicted Probability .804       
Intercept 1.710       
-2LogL 4,045.8       
Chi-Sq 79.6       
     
Asterisks denote levels of statistical significance. 
* = significant at the 90% level; ** = significant at the 95% level. 
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VI. URL COST ANALYSIS 
Bowman (1995) concludes that in order to maintain a given endstrength and force 
structure of high quality officers in a steady state environment, it is necessary to assess 
the requirement for these officers and differences in individual retention and promotion 
rates.  He further distinguishes between technical and economic efficiency. Results of the 
preliminary analysis of retention and promotion rates in Chapter IV and the multivariate 
analyses in Chapter V indicate USNA is the most technically efficient accession source in 
retaining and promoting officers to O-4 in URL and RL communities.  Despite being 
technically efficient in producing O-4’s, USNA may not be the most economically 
efficient of the accession sources due its high pre-commissioning education costs.  The 
methodology for analyzing costs in this chapter is based on Bowman’s (1995) 
methodology, and relies on computing a “steady state flow” of accessions for each 
commissioning accession source and community.  
The steady state flow of accession is determined from a simple mathematical 
calculation that accounts for retention and promotion rate differentials.  The equation for 
the steady state number of accessions is: 
 
      Steady State                             __________1_____________ 
Number of Accessions    =     (Retention Rate x Promotion Rate to O-4) 
 
The steady state number of accessions corresponds to the number of accessions 
required to retain and promote one officer to LCDR.  The cost of producing one LCDR 
from each commissioning source is then obtained by multiplying the steady state number 
of accessions by the total pre-and post-commissioning training costs.  In this thesis, two 
different models have been developed to demonstrate the difference between average and 
marginal pre-commissioning costs.  Average pre-commissioning costs were obtained 
from Bowman (1995).  Bowman’s (1995) findings were reproduced in Table 1, Chapter 
II.  Marginal pre-commissioning costs were obtained from Parcell (2001). 
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The pre-commissioning costs calculated in Table 39 are notably different from 
Bowman’s (1995) listed in Table 1.  Bowman (1995) applied a 10% discount rate to 1994 
cost figures obtained from the Office of the Comptroller, The United States Naval 
Academy and the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET).  Pre-commissioning 
costs listed in Table 39 have been discounted at a rate of 7%, vice 10%, and inflated at a 
rate of 18.4% to convert dollar figures to 2002 dollars.    
Estimated post-commissioning costs from YCS1 to YCS10 have been calculated 
using direct and indirect costs associated with lifecycle education and training in the URL 
warfare communities.  Direct costs represent the cost of providing human capital 
investment, while indirect (opportunity) costs reflect the cost to the Navy of an officer’s 
forgone time while serving in an education/training billet or during the time spent 
acquiring a warfare qualification (Bowman, 1995).  The total of direct and indirect costs 
for each warfare community are listed in Tables 34-37 in the column labeled “TRNG 
COSTS.”  These costs were obtained from Bowman (1995) and are measured in 1994 
dollars.  Bowman (1995) based these estimates on the typical career patterns of officers 
in each URL community.  Since no post-commissioning cost data for Restricted Line 
officers was available for this analysis, this chapter analyzes only URL steady state cost-
effectiveness. 
A. URL COST EFFECTIVENESS USING AVERAGE PRE-
COMMISSIONING COSTS 
Tables 34-37 also indicate the actual and present value of the post-commissioning 
costs associated with each community and commissioning source. Costs listed in the 
column “ACTUAL VALUES” account for differences in education and training costs 
during the career period O1-O3 (YCS1-YCS4) and O3-O4 (YCS5-YCS10).  Actual costs 
were calculated by multiplying the retention rate indicated in the column “% STAY TO 
LAST YEAR” by the costs listed in the column “TRNG COSTS.”  “ACTUAL 
VALUES” were further discounted at a rate of 7% to produce the present value of total 
post-commissioning costs incurred by the Navy to the O-4 career point. 
Table 38 identifies the total steady state costs necessary to produce one O-4 from 
each accession source by URL community.  These steady state lifecycle costs are 
comprised of average pre-commissioning costs (column 1) and post-commissioning costs 
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(column 2).  The sum of these costs is listed in column 3.  The steady state number of 
accessions required to produce one O-4 are listed in column 4.  The total present value 
costs from Tables 34-37 were inflated at a rate of 18.4% to express costs in 2002 dollars.  
These costs are the post-commissioning costs listed in Tables 38 and 40.  Additionally, 
multiplying required accessions in column 4 by total costs in column 3 yield the “COSTS 
PER O-4” in column 5.  
The results in Table 38 are summarized in Table 39, which indicates that no 
single accession source has a monopoly on cost-effectiveness across the four URL 
communities.  In the Surface community, ROTC-Contract is the most cost-effective 
source while USNA is the least cost-effective.  It is important to note that USNA has the 
lowest required number of accessions to produce a single O-4 in three of the four URL 
communities, and is ranked second in the Surface community.  Despite the fact that 
USNA graduates stay and promote at higher rates than the other accession sources, the 
differences are not sufficient to overcome the higher average pre-commissioning cost for 
USNA graduates.  
The results in Tables 38 and 39 indicate that steady state flow costs by 
commissioning source in the Submarine community are consistent with the Surface 
community.  ROTC-Contract remains the most cost-effective source, followed closely by 
OCS, then ROTC-Scholarship, and USNA.  In the Pilot community, USNA becomes the 
most cost-effective program due to the combined effect of a lower steady state number of 
accessions and higher post-commissioning costs relative to pre-commissioning costs. 
ROTC-Scholarship is second in terms of cost-effectiveness, while OCS is least cost-
effective at producing O-4 pilots.  Analysis of NFO steady state costs reveal significantly 
different accession source rankings than in the pilot community. USNA is most cost-
effective at producing O-4 NFO’s, while ROTC-Contract is second, OCS is third, and 
ROTC Scholarship is least cost-effective.  
B. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF COMMISSIONING SOURCES 
USING MARGINAL COSTS  
In a recent 2001 study by the Center for Naval Analyses, Parcell (2001) 
determines marginal costs associated with making incremental increases in the size of the 
USNA Brigade of Midshipmen.  The CNA study approaches the topic of cost-
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effectiveness from the standpoint of analyzing marginal increases of 100 or more 
accessions per year from USNA versus OCS.  The basis for marginal cost comparisons is 
whether or not an accession source is currently operating at full capacity.  Parcell (2001) 
notes that USNA’s current size of 4,000 is less than its design capacity of 4,400.  Due to 
this excess capacity, USNA could absorb an increase of 100 accessions at a cost far less 
than those indicated by the average cost numbers in Table 38.  NROTC and OCS on the 
other hand are assumed to be currently operating at full capacity.  Therefore, increases in 
the size of these programs would result in substantially greater costs than those listed in 
Table 38.   
In an effort to analyze the impact of using marginal pre-commissioning costs, 
Table 40 substitutes the marginal costs generated by the CNA study for average costs.  
The cost-effectiveness results are summarized in Table 41.  In comparison to the results 
in Tables 38 and 39, USNA is no longer the least cost-effective accession source in the 
SWO community; USNA is now competitive with the other accession sources.  ROTC-
Contract remains the most cost-effective, while ROTC-Scholarship is the least cost-
effective by more than $460,000.  Results in the Submarine community are substantially 
different in Tables 40 and 41 as well. USNA is the most cost-effective, followed by OCS, 
ROTC-Contract, and ROTC-Scholarship.  
In the Pilot community, USNA remains the most cost-effective by more than 
$500,000.  ROTC-Scholarship is second, and ROTC-Contract is third.  OCS is the least 
cost-effective accession source in the Pilot community, just as it was in Tables 38 and 39.  
Analysis of the NFO community reveals similar results to those indicated in Table 38.  
USNA is the most cost-effective accession source, yet the cost differential between 
USNA and ROTC-Contract (second) increases from $52,000 in Table 38 to over 
$440,000 in Table 40.  OCS remains in third position in this model, with ROTC-
Scholarship as the least cost-effective at producing NFO’s. 
C. SUMMARY 
The costs analysis in this chapter provides a framework for assessing each 
commissioning program in a steady state environment.  The results of Tables 38 and 40 
indicate that the use of marginal pre-commissioning costs relative to average costs can 
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impact both the steady state cost per O-4 and the relative efficiency of each 
commissioning source.  Using marginal costs for pre-commissioning costs seems to make 
USNA as competitive and cost-effective in the Surface and Submarine communities as it 
is in the Aviation community when average cost is used.  While no single accession 
source is always the most cost-effective or least cost-effective in all four communities, 
ROTC-Scholarship fares much worse in the marginal cost model.  Additionally, the 
steady state cost analysis supports the theory that accessions from ROTC-Contract not 
only promote to O-4 at different rates than ROTC- Scholarship accessions, but they cost 
less in all URL communities except the Pilot community.    
Currently, the demand for experienced and more senior URL officers is expected 
to grow. (Parcell, 2001)  In order to make trade-off decisions and incremental increases in 
accessions in response to this demand, the Navy’s leadership needs to know if one 
accession source is producing a specific community of officers at a rate less costly than 
another accession source.  The results of Tables 38-41 support USNA as the premier 
commissioning program for these increased accessions.  While the Navy does not access 
many officers from the ROTC-Contract program, the results in this chapter may signal a 
need to recruit more of these officers to fill personnel shortages that cannot be met by the 
ROTC-Scholarship program, and would otherwise require additional OCS accessions.     






























Table 34.   Estimated Post-Commissioning Education and Training Costs for SWO’s (1994 
Dollars). 
 
TOTAL COSTS ADJUSTED FOR SEPARATIONS 














USNA        
   1-4: 1.00 51,093 51,093 41,707 
   5-10: 0.31 108,352 33,924 25,881 
TOTAL   159,445 85,017 67,588 
ROTCS         
   1-4: 1.00 51,093 51,093 41,707 
   5-10: 0.22 108,352 23,516 17,940 
TOTAL   159,445 74,609 59,647 
ROTCC         
   1-4: 1.00 51,093 51,093 41,707 
   5-10: 0.34 108,352 108,352 28,243 
TOTAL   159,445 159,445 69,950 
OCS         
   1-4: 1.00 51,093 51,093 41,707 
   5-10: 0.31 108,352 33,104 25,255 
TOTAL   159,445 84,197 66,962 











Table 35.   Estimated Post-Commissioning Education and Training Costs for Submariners 
(1994 Dollars). 
 
TOTAL COSTS ADJUSTED FOR SEPARATIONS 














USNA         
   1-4: 1.00 117,837 117,837 96,190 
   5-10: 0.31 64,200 19,633 14,978 
TOTAL   182,037 137,470 111,168 
ROTCS         
   1-4: 1.00 117,837 117,837 96,190 
   5-10: 0.27 64,200 17,502 13,352 
TOTAL   182,037 135,339 109,543 
ROTCC         
   1-4: 1.00 117,837 117,837 96,190 
   5-10: 0.30 64,200 19,260 14,693 
TOTAL   182,037 137,097 110,883 
OCS         
   1-4: 1.00 117,837 117,837 96,190 
   5-10: 0.23 64,200 14,804 11,294 
TOTAL   182,037 132,641 107,484 










Table 36.   Estimated Post-Commissioning Education and Training Costs for Pilots (1994 
Dollars). 
 
TOTAL COSTS ADJUSTED FOR SEPARATIONS 














USNA         
   1-4: 1.00 1,319,100 1,319,100 1,076,779 
   5-10: 0.63 24,534 15,522 11,842 
TOTAL   1,343,634 1,334,622 1,088,620 
ROTCS         
   1-4: 1.00 1,319,100 1,319,100 1,076,779 
   5-10: 0.61 24,534 14,917 11,380 
TOTAL   1,343,634 1,334,017 1,088,159 
ROTCC         
   1-4: 1.00 1,319,100 1,319,100 1,076,779 
   5-10: 0.56 24,534 13,731 10,475 
TOTAL   1,343,634 1,332,831 1,087,254 
OCS         
   1-4: 1.00 1,319,100 1,076,779 1,319,100 
   5-10: 0.41 24,534 10,042 7,661 
TOTAL   
     













Table 37.   Estimated Post-Commissioning Education and Training Costs for NFO’s (1994 
Dollars). 
 
TOTAL COSTS ADJUSTED FOR SEPARATIONS 














USNA         
  1-4: 1.00 1,477,000 1,477,000 1,205,672 
  5-10: 0.58 24,534 14,148 10,794 
TOTAL   1,501,534 1,491,148 1,216,466 
ROTCS         
  1-4: 1.00 1,477,000 1,477,000 1,205,672 
  5-10: 0.55 24,534 13,551 10,338 
TOTAL   1,501,534 1,490,551 1,216,010 
ROTCC         
  1-4: 1.00 1,477,000 1,477,000 1,205,672 
  5-10: 0.53 24,534 13,085 9,982 
TOTAL   1,501,534 1,490,085 1,215,654 
OCS         
  1-4: 1.00 1,477,000 1,477,000 1,205,672 
  5-10: 0.50 24,534 12,249 9,345 
TOTAL   1,501,534 1,489,249 1,215,017 












Table 38.   URL Costs Per O-4 Using Average Pre-Commissioning Costs. 
AVERAGE PRE-AND POST-COMMISSIONING COSTS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN 











SURFACE:           
     USNA 229,227 80,044 309,271 4.47 1,382,442
     ROTC Scholarship 93,653 70,640 164,293 7.20 1,182,911
     ROTC Contract 53,620 82,841 136,461 4.29 585,416 
     OCS 43,880 79,302 123,182 6.36 783,435 
SUBMARINE:           
     USNA 229,227 131,656 360,883 4.10 1,479,621
     ROTC Scholarship 93,653 129,731 223,384 5.10 1,139,260
     ROTC Contract 53,620 131,319 184,939 5.00 924,693 
     OCS 43,880 127,293 171,173 5.72 979,107 
PILOT:           
     USNA 229,227 1,289,253 1,518,480 2.31 3,507,689
     ROTC Scholarship 93,653 1,288,707 1,382,360 2.66 3,677,078
     ROTC Contract 53,620 1,287,635 1,341,255 3.20 4,292,014
     OCS 34,813 1,284,301 1,319,114 3.49 4,603,709
NFO:           
     USNA 229,227 1,440,660 1,669,887 2.58 4,308,309
     ROTC Scholarship 93,653 1,440,120 1,533,773 3.02 4,631,995
     ROTC Contract 53,620 1,439,699 1,493,319 2.92 4,360,490
     OCS 34,813 1,438,944 1,473,757 3.09 4,553,911
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Table 39.   URL Cost-Effectiveness Using Average Costs. 
 
Community Most Cost-Effective Least Cost-Effective $ Difference 
SURFACE ROTC-Contract USNA   
  $585,416 $1,382,442 $797,026 
SUBMARINE ROTC-Contract USNA   
  $924,693 $1,479,621 $554,928 
PILOT USNA OCS   
  $3,507,689 $4,603,709 $1,096,020 
NFO USNA ROTC-Scholarship   
  $4,308,309 $4,631,995 $323,686 
 
Table 40.   URL Costs Per O-4 Using Marginal Pre-Commissioning Costs. 
MARGINAL PRE-AND POST-COMMISSIONING COSTS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN 











SURFACE:           
     USNA 121,000 80,044 201,044 4.47 898,667 
     ROTC Scholarship 132,000 70,640 202,640 7.20 1,459,008
     ROTC Contract 91,967 82,841 174,808 4.29 749,926 
     OCS 58,000 79,302 137,302 6.36 873,241 
SUBMARINE:           
     USNA 121,000 131,656 252,656 4.10 1,035,890
     ROTC Scholarship 132,000 129,731 261,731 5.10 1,334,828
     ROTC Contract 91,967 131,319 223,286 5.00 1,116,430
     OCS 58,000 127,293 185,293 5.72 1,059,876
PILOT:           
     USNA 121,000 1,289,253 1,410,253 2.31 3,257,684
     ROTC Scholarship 132,000 1,288,707 1,420,707 2.66 3,779,081
     ROTC Contract 91,967 1,287,635 1,379,602 3.20 4,414,726
     OCS 58,000 1,284,301 1,342,301 3.49 4,684,630
NFO:           
     USNA 121,000 1,440,660 1,561,660 2.58 4,029,083
     ROTC Scholarship 132,000 1,440,120 1,572,120 3.02 4,747,802
     ROTC Contract 91,967 1,439,699 1,531,666 2.92 4,472,465








Table 41.   URL Cost-Effectiveness Using Marginal Costs. 
 
Community Most Cost-Effective Least Cost-Effective $ Difference 
SURFACE ROTC-Contract ROTC-Scholarship   
  $749,926 $1,459,008 $709,082 
SUBMARINE USNA ROTC-Scholarship   
  $1,035,890 $1,334,828 $298,938 
PILOT USNA OCS   
  $3,257,684 $4,684,630 $1,426,946 
NFO USNA ROTC-Scholarship   
  $4,029,083 $4,747,802 $718,719 
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The results of the models for both retention to the O-4 point and promotion to O-4 
indicate that the effects of accession source significantly affect the probability that an 
officer chooses to remain on active service, and the probability that an officer promotes 
given he/she stays.  In the second URL retention model, ROTC-Scholarship and ROTC-
Contract accessions were more likely to stay to the O-4 promotion board than USNA 
accessions. In this same model, when USNA graduates were compared to other 
accessions that attended highly selective colleges and universities, ROTC-Scholarship 
and OCS accessions were substantially less likely to stay than USNA accessions.  These 
results suggest that graduates of elite colleges and universities find better career 
opportunities in the civilian job market, and are less likely to stay in the Navy past their 
MSR compared to accessions from the same commissioning programs who graduate 
from less selective colleges (Bowman and Mehay, 2002). 
In the Restricted Line retention models, ROTC-Scholarship and OCS graduates 
accounted for over 80% of the observations in the sample and were more likely to stay to 
O-4 than USNA graduates. ROTC-Contract graduates were also more likely to stay than 
USNA graduates.  Like the results in the URL models, ROTC-Scholarship and OCS 
accessions who attended elite colleges and universities were substantially less likely to 
stay than USNA accessions.  RL and URL retention models show additional similarities 
in the impact of prior service, technical major and APC score.  In both URL and RL 
models, prior service had a large, positive impact on retention to O-4.  Conversely, 
officers with technical majors and higher undergraduate GPA’s were more likely to leave 
the Navy prior to the O-4 promotion board.  These results are consistent with those of 
officers who attended elite colleges and universities.  Technical majors appear to find 
better career opportunities in the civilian job market, while officers with lower 
undergraduate GPA’s find better career opportunities in the Navy. 
Analysis of the promotion results revealed different impacts of commissioning 
source compared to the retention models.  While USNA graduates were less likely to stay 
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to the O-4 point, the other commissioning sources were less likely to promote to O-4 than 
USNA graduates.  The results of the promotion models also indicate the Navy appears to 
earn a positive economic return on accessions from elite colleges and universities, as they 
are more likely to promote to O-4 than accessions from the same commissioning program 
but from less selective colleges.   
Prior service, technical major, and college grades affect promotion differently 
than in the retention models. Prior service influenced promotion very little in the URL 
communities, but made a sizeable positive impact in the RL communities.  Officers with 
technical majors in the Surface and Aviation communities and officers with higher 
GPA’s were more likely to promote than officers with non-technical majors and lower 
GPA’s.  Promotion results in the RL sample also revealed that Fleet Support and Supply 
Corps officers were substantially less likely to promote to O-4 than RL Staff officers.  
These results were consistent in sign and but lower in magnitude than RL community 
retention differentials.  Fleet Support (37.9%) and Supply Corps (34.4%) officers were 
less likely to stay than RL Staff officers, yet only 7.8% and 4.0%, respectively, less likely 
to promote than RL Staff officers. 
Finally, the promotion models allowed analysis of the impact of lateral 
transferring from one community to another on O-4 promotion.  Lateral transfers who 
appeared in the Aviation and Submarine communities at the O-4 board were more likely 
to promote than those who started their careers in these communities and remained in 
them.  Conversely, lateral transfers into the Surface community were less likely to 
promote to O-4 than SWO’s who started and remained in surface.  The results of the RL 
promotion models indicate URL’s with warfare qualifications who laterally transferred 
into RL communities were more likely to promote to O-4 than officers that spent their 
careers in the Restricted Line communities.  This emphasizes again the value of having a 
warfare qualification (“pin”).  URL and RL Officers with a warfare qualification appear 
to be more productive than those without warfare qualifications due to the extensive 





The cost-effectiveness analysis of alternate commissioning sources in this thesis 
provide OSD decision makers with tangible information to make future accession size 
and force structure decisions.  The results are important and valuable because the data is 
not only current, but the officers represented in these data samples are currently in 
command and screening for command of the Navy’s ships, submarines, aircraft 
squadrons, and shore based installations.  
The cost analyses developed in Chapter VI support the conclusions of previous 
studies (Bowman 1995, Parcell 2001) that find USNA is the most cost-effective 
commissioning program for meeting future accession increases.  Results in this thesis 
also indicate that ROTC-Contact is an accession source that has been underutilized by the 
Navy.  In general, accessions from this source are more likely to stay and promote to O-4 
than accessions from ROTC-Scholarship and OCS. Despite these results, the Navy is 
unable to use the ROTC-Contract program as the primary accession source for certain 
communities due to size limitations.  The ROTC-Scholarship program is currently and 
should remain the primary accession source for the large number of billets in the Aviation 
communities.   
Although ROTC-Scholarship graduates appear to cost significantly more than 
graduates from other accession sources in the Surface, Submarine and NFO communities, 
it is important to note that this thesis does not recommend decreasing the size of the 
ROTC Scholarship Program.  The results merely suggest that the Navy should examine 
the USNA and ROTC-Contact programs when making future accession increases.   
The results of this study also indicate that the OCS program does not retain or 
promote as large a percentage of career officers in either the URL or RL communities, 
relative to USNA and ROTC-C.  Again, OCS is a valuable commissioning program to the 
Navy because it commissions a sizeable number of URL’s at an extremely low pre-
commissioning cost, and remains the primary accession source for the RL communities.  
However, OCS graduates left the Navy at much higher rates and were less likely to 
promote to O-4 than entrants from other commissioning programs.   
81 
Additionally, the results of this thesis do not support the belief that having a 
technical degree is critical to future success in the Navy or the O-4 promotion outcome.  
The results revealed technical majors were more likely to promote in four of the 11 
promotion models, specifically in the Surface and Submarine communities.  However, 
the effect of having a technical degree was quite small, generally less than 3%.  Having a 
technical degree in the Submarine and RL communities did not impact the promotion 
outcome.  It is also interesting that approximately 90% of the officers that stayed to the 
O-4 board in the Submarine community, perhaps the most technically demanding career 
in the Navy in terms of nuclear power, were technical majors, yet technical major was not 
important to the promotion outcome.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two primary recommendations result from this thesis.  The first is that Navy 
decision makers consider USNA as the primary source to meet future demand for higher 
accessions relative to the ROTC and OCS programs.  This recommendation holds true so 
long as the Naval Academy is operating below its design capacity of 4,400 midshipmen.   
The second recommendation is that the following data elements be collected and 
analyzed to estimate the impact of initial experiences of officers in the fleet while serving 
their minimum service obligation. 
• Ship, squadron, and submarine command to include distinctions between 
Atlantic or Pacific Fleet 
• Length of deployment 
• Average time spent away from homeport during Inter-Deployment 
Training Cycle (IDTC) 
• Time between date of commission and completion of warfare qualification 
• Officer designator at separation, vice designator at last selection board on 
file 
Analysis of these data elements is critical to the retention and promotion 
outcomes of the officers for Navy Officers.  Retention and promotion beyond the 
minimum service obligation is believed to be less related to academic experience or 
source of accession and more likely to be related to officers’ initial work experiences in 
the fleet (Bowman 1995).  Finally, future cost-effectiveness studies should analyze Navy 
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officer retention and promotion to the O-5 and O-6 career points, and compare those 
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